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Public expenditure decisions increasingly require demonstratable benefits from each area of expenditure.
At the same time, investment in human capital represents a form of investment in which individuals typically
bear considerable specific, as well as systematic, risks regarding future returns on their investment. This
paper develops a framework in which the social benefits of increased  expenditure on careers guidance can
be assessed using the tools of economic analysis and decision theory. After examining these benefits from
the viewpoint of risk management, the paper examines the quality of life measurement issues which are
raised by career choice. It concludes with an examination of the  wider social and macroeconomic benefits
from improved labour market flexibility that investment in careers guidance may achieve.   2
1. INTRODUCTION
Education and training for post-16 year olds represent a major item of public expenditure. The budget of
the new Learning and Skills Council (LSC), that is responsible for all post-16 education and training,
excluding higher education, itself totals £7.315 billion for 2002-2003, including £1.355 billion for Sixth
Form funding. Careers guidance to assist individuals in making improved career choices can play a
significant role in helping to ensure that good use is made of the expenditure on education and training, and
of the nation’s resultant skills base. 
There are several reasons why it is becoming increasingly desirable to be able to assess and optimise the
benefits of expenditure on careers guidance:
a. careers guidance competes with many other forms of public expenditure, such as that on the National
Health Service, for the finite total funds which the Chancellor of the Exchequer decides periodically to make
available in each Comprehensive Spending Review. An inability to demonstrate quantifiable levels of
benefits from the substantial current levels of expenditure on it will leave careers guidance in a weaker
competitive position for continuing to secure this level of  public funding. A failure to organise well the case
for adequate funding for careers guidance is likely to result in inadequate levels of service provision, and
a failure to reap the potential benefits which well-funded careers guidance could achieve. If higher levels
of public expenditure on careers guidance are to be justified, an ability to demonstrate and, as far as
possible, quantify the additional benefits which such additional expenditure can achieve becomes an even
stronger requirement in the competition for public funding.
b.  Each Comprehensive Spending Review is  now accompanied by Public Service Agreements, and more
detailed Service Delivery Agreements, between individual Government Departments, such as the
Department for Education and Skills (DfES), and HM Treasury. These specify quantitative targets for
service achievements which each main area of public expenditure is expected to deliver in return for the
public funding provided. Being able to clearly identify service achievements in quantitative terms becomes
a key part of this process. There is a strong case for seeking to ensure that the agreed targets for service
achievements align well with the underlying objectives that careers guidance can help achieve. If these are3
to be realistic targets, they should also reflect the ability of careers guidance providers to deliver the
intended levels of achievement for the proposed level of public funding. Being able to assess the magnitude,
and relative importance, of  the different quantitative deliverables which careers guidance might achieve in
return for different levels of public funding is a key task in the development of evidence-based policy. The
2002 Comprehensive Spending Review is itself placing increased emphasis on the development of the
evidence base for policy-making (HM Treasury, 2002), in line with the earlier Modernising Government
White Paper (Cabinet Office, 1999).  This task would be assisted by greater knowledge of the quantitative
benefits that careers guidance can achieve in each relevant direction in return for different levels of public
funding.
c.  There is a need to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in resource allocation, from any given total level
of public funding for careers guidance services through the national agency of the Learning and Skills
Council, down to the local devolved agencies of the local LSCs. Each local agency will typically face
varying local socio-economic circumstances for its intended careers guidance recipients. These varying
circumstances are likely to impact upon the costs and the benefits associated with different levels of careers
guidance provision in the localities concerned. Being able to assess these respective costs and benefits can
assist in ensuring that efficiency and effectiveness are achieved in how the available national funds are
distributed across different localities. 
d.  Each individual local LSC, in conjunction with its local careers guidance providers, will need to decide
on how best to allocate its devolved budget across different possible forms of service provision. Being able
to assess both the costs and the benefits of different levels of careers guidance for different target groups
can assist in the development of  resource management policies that can ensure that the total available local
funds are deployed in the most efficient and effective ways.
e. Issues of the appropriate levels of  service quality which individual careers guidance providers should
achieve are relevant to the process of accreditation of these providers. Knowledge of the benefits which
different levels of service quality can achieve compared to their cost could assist in the setting of  target
levels of service quality which individual service providers should achieve.4
f. Achieving best value in the use of public funds is a statutory requirement for local authorities in England
under the Local Government Act 1999  (see DETR, 1998). Being able to assess and quantify these benefits
at the local level is likely to become an increasingly requirement within the best value regime. This in turn
requires the development of appropriate quantitative performance  indicators of local service achievements.
If the quantitative indicators are poorly designed, they may not align well with the underlying objectives of
careers guidance and  the potential benefits which guidance can achieve. There is then a risk that the
indicators will create perverse incentives for local managers simply to manage the indicators, rather than
maximise the benefits of their guidance provision. Well-designed quantitative performance indicators
therefore need to be closely aligned to the benefits which good careers guidance can achieve for its
recipients (see Mayston, 1985, 2000a).
There are thus many ways in which an assessment of the benefits of careers guidance can play  an important
role in policy making and resource management. There is a strong case for ensuring that the response to
each of the above pressures for the development of  performance and outcome measures is a well-
coordinated system that helps to maximise the benefits that are achieved from the resources deployed in
careers guidance. Information and performance measures need to be part of an integrated management
system for careers guidance, information and advice that is carefully designed to achieve optimal overall
outcomes.
The challenge which faces the careers guidance sector from the above developments is in large part a
financial and economic one. A greater recognition of the economic role of careers guidance can help to
meet this challenge, whilst complementing other perspectives on the role of careers guidance, such as those
from cognitive psychologists. The need for this recognition is underlined by the economic policy importance
of a well-functioning labour market and a reduction in the extent of social exclusion, to which high quality
careers guidance can make positive contributions. As we emphasise below,  there is a need to incorporate
explicit consideration of the role of risk, uncertainty and imperfect information into the economic assessment
of the benefits of careers guidance, alongside quality of life issues and wider social benefits.
The role of careers guidance in our present context we take to be:
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i. to provide information to the individual careers advisee on the changes in net income and other possible
payoffs that are likely to result from successfully completing different possible career moves
ii. to elicit information from the individual advisee on their preferences over different possible
characteristics of the payoffs, including those relating to quality of life, that are associated with different
possible career choices
iii.  to make progress in assessing the suitability of the individual career advisee for successfully
completing the additional training and/or further education or other investment that is required for different
possible career moves, based upon information on the individual’s skills, talents and aptitudes.
A framework theory for assessing the benefits of the careers guidance interview can itself help to facilitate
progress in the following directions:
a. the attachments of monetary values to the benefits generated by the careers guidance interview
b. the assessment of  the enhanced monetary and other benefits generated by improved levels of  quality
in the careers guidance given in the careers guidance interview
c. the assessment of the value for money in service delivery that is provided by different levels of quality
in the careers guidance given in the careers guidance interview
d. assisting in the development of cost-effective standards of service delivery in careers guidance
e. providing the analytical framework for the development of an information base on the contributions
made by different individual careers guidance providers
f. assisting in the development of performance indicators that can monitor the extent to which the potential
benefits, and associated value for money, of the careers guidance interview are being achieved at local
regional and national levels6
g. assessing the relative effectiveness of different individual careers guidance providers
h. providing the analytical framework within which the case for different levels of financial support for the
careers guidance service, locally, regionally and nationally can be developed in a robust way.
In Sections 2 - 4 below, we seek to identify micro-economic outcomes and concepts which are relevant
to assessing the benefits of different levels of quality of the advice provided by the careers guidance
interview. This includes relevant aspects of the theory of human capital formation in Section 2, and the
value of information in Section 3. The benefits associated from enhancements in quality of life resulting
from good quality careers advice are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we examine the benefits from
good quality careers guidance from wider perspectives than those benefits which accrue directly to
the individual recipient of the careers advice. In doing so, we can build upon the earlier contribution of
Killeen, White and Watts (1992) on the economic value of careers guidance. These wider perspectives
include macro-economic benefits, taxation and social security benefits, public expenditure benefits and
other externalities flowing from improved career choices and higher quality careers guidance.7






2. INVESTING IN HUMAN CAPITAL
In Sections 2 -3 we will initially assume that an individual’s monetary income is the only variable which
affects the individual’s welfare, before turning to the incorporation of other quality of life variables in
Sections 4 and 5. Under this assumption, the value of the individual’s  human capital at the present time
(denoted by t = 0) may be expressed as the net present value of their future flow of net income (see
Becker, 1993). Net income, Yi t , at time t for individual i is itself the difference between individual i’s gross
income Mi t at time t and their expenditures, Xi t , at time t in securing this flow of gross income. These
expenditures may include the cost of job-related travel, job-related clothing and any education and training
costs which fall upon the individual. In addition, they may include the cost of moving house to locate closer
to the new job, and any higher levels of accommodation expenses, such as rents and mortgage payments,
in living closer to the location of the new job. These additional expenditure items may be significant if job
opportunities and pay levels are greater in some parts of the UK, such as the South East of England, than
others, but are also accompanied by higher accommodation, commuting or other such  job-related costs.
The future flow of net income Y i 0 , ....., Y i  n for individual i for the next n years may be denoted by a
vector Yi = (Yi 0 , ....., Y i n), whose net present value, and associated value of human capital, Hi , for the
individual is given by:
                          (2.1)
where r is the discount rate applied to future net income, which is assumed here for simplicity to be constant
over time.  If we measure each period’s net income, Y i t , in money terms at the price level prevailing in
year t, allowing for general inflation, the relevant discount rate should be in money terms, such as the money
rate of interest. Alternatively, if we measure each period’s net income, Y i t , in real constant-price terms,
after netting out the effects of general inflation, the relevant discount rate should be in real terms, such as
the real rate of interest (equal to the annual money rate of interest less the annual rate of inflation). 8
Since career choices may well affect an individual’s pension income in retirement, another question which
arises here is the time horizon, n, over which the above net present value is taken. One choice would be
for n to be the remaining total life-time of the individual, including their period of retirement from work.
Their gross income, Mi t , during their retirement years would then be included within the calculation of their
human capital in (2.1), but so too would their pension contributions during their working life-times, as
expenditures associated with securing their future pension income. An alternative approach would be to
treat n as referring only to the period of time before retirement, without deducting pension contributions in
the calculation of their net income. However, this would be to neglect potentially large employers’
contributions and other factors which might affect the individual’s future pension income. Whilst employers’
pension contributions might be included as part of the individual’s accrued income over their working life,
once uncertainty and other factors are taken into account it may be more accurate to consider n as referring
to the future life-time of the individual, with an individual’s actual standard of living in their retirement years
an increasingly important consideration in making life-time career choices.
In the simple case where there is no uncertainty, careers guidance may seek to increase the value of the
individual’s human capital by helping them to realise a higher level of the net present value of future life-time
income. In some cases, such as where careers guidance results in a move directly into a better paid job,
this may boost the individual’s net income in each future time period. We will then have )Y i t > 0 for all
t = 1, ... , n, where   )Y i t denotes the change in individual i’s income in period t which results from the
careers guidance. However, in other cases, the careers guidance may result in the individual undertaking
a period of further education or training which may cause their net income initially to decline, so that there
is an element of foregone earnings plus also potentially some other costs, in the form of fees, books, and
other expenses they would not otherwise have incurred, to the individual in undertaking the future education
or training, making  the initial values of the changes in net income, )Y i t , negative in value. However, if the
training or education is successful in securing a better-paid job for the individual, later changes, )Y i t , in
the individual’s net income will be positive. Figure 2.1 below illustrates the case where, in the absence of
careers guidance, the individual would remain at a constant level of net income, Yo
i  , throughout their life.
However, as a result of careers guidance, the individual experiences a new time path of net income Y’i  
= (Y’i 0 , ..,Y i t).9
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FIGURE 2.1
 
If the rate of return to the individual on this investment in additional education or training exceeds the rate
of interest, r, in (2.1) the result will be an overall increase in the net present value, NPV, of future earnings,
after taking into account the discounted value of these positive and vertical elements. 
The differences in the time path of earnings, Y’i , after the careers guidance and the time path of earnings
in the absence of careers guidance in Figure 2.1 when discounted using the discount factor i will then be
positive overall.   There is then a boost to the value, Hi , of the individual’s human capital in (2.1), with )
Hi > 0 in (2.2) below:
              (2.2)10
where )Yi t equals Y’i t - Yo
 i t , the difference in individual i’s net income at time t resulting from the careers
guidance. 
Equation (2.2) gives the monetary value of the value added to the individual’s human capital, with the
concept of value added being an important indicator of performance and organisational success in
education (see e.g. Jesson, 2001) and elsewhere (see Kay, 1993). In contrast to standard League Tables
of the unadjusted examination performance achieved by the pupils in different schools, value added
measures in secondary and primary education (see Mayston and Jesson, 1999) provide quantitative
measures of the educational progress which each school achieves for its pupils, after adjusting for their
prior attainment at earlier stages in the educational process. Schools which achieve high levels of
examination passes for pupils who have an advantaged social background and strong prior attainments in
earlier stages of the educational process may then achieve a smaller value added than a school which
achieves slightly lower levels of examination passes for pupils who are disadvantaged in their social
background, and who have weaker prior attainments in earlier stages of the educational process.
Similarly, different careers guidance providers may have client groups who differ significantly in their initial
characteristics. A provider that helps to secure well-paid jobs for those from advantaged social and
educational backgrounds may achieve  less value added than a provider who secures more moderately-
paid jobs for those from disadvantaged backgrounds. The value added measure (2.2) is based upon the
change in the value of human capital which results from the provision of the careers guidance. As we shall
see later, if there is a policy stance of  social aversion to inequality, the monetary measure may be further
adjusted to reflect diminishing marginal utility of income to take account of such inequality aversion.
 
Since the further education and training may involve an element of subsidy from the government, and
careers guidance itself costs money to provide, we need also to take these additional costs into account
in deriving the overall net benefit from the careers guidance and associated further education and/or training.
If we denote by Di the level of public subsidy in the additional training and/or education which the individual
receives, and by Ci the cost of the careers guidance which individual i receives, the overall net benefit is:11
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(2.3)
The social rate of return, si , on the investments Di and Ci  is given by the value of the discount rate that
yields an overall value of zero to the net benefit, i.e.:
        (2.4)
being of the form of an internal rate of return on these investments. However, it is well known (see
Brealey and Myers, 2000 ) that internal rates of return are not well-behaved indicators of the benefits of
investment, in circumstances when some of the future annual benefits, here the )Y i t , can be negative in
value. As we have noted, careers guidance may indeed result in the individual incurring initial costs of
foregone earnings and other costs associated with additional training or further education, that cause  the
)Y i t , to become negative in value. A further circumstance under which internal rates of return are not well
behaved indicators of the benefits of investment  occurs when the investments to be compared are
mutually exclusive. One form of mutually exclusive investment does indeed occur when we consider
different possible levels of quality in the provision of careers guidance. Use of the rate of return on careers
guidance derived from internal rate of return calculations, as in (2.4), will then be inappropriate.
 
In order to consider explicitly different levels of quality in the careers guidance offered to individual i, we
may examine the way in which the variables in (2.4) are likely to depend upon the level, Qi , of quality in
the careers guidance offered, where Qi  is a variable that increases with increasing quality of careers
guidance for individual i. We would expect firstly that  the new time path, Y’i  , of individual i’s net income
will change with the quality of careers guidance offered, making each Y’i t  dependent upon Qi . Since
higher quality careers advice may result in  individual i undergoing higher initial levels of training and/ further
education, each of the new levels of income,  Y’i t   , may not increase with the quality of careers advice,12
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Qi . However, we would expect that the value of individual i’s human capital, as reflected in the net
present value of the changes, )Yi t , in their net income which they experience as a result of the careers
guidance would increase with the quality of careers guidance offered. However, we would also expect that
the cost Ci of the careers guidance would also increase with the quality of the guidance. Thus if the
guidance involves the provision of more information, more detailed research and more staff time spent in
giving advice to the individual, the associated cost is likely to increase. Higher quality advice may also affect
the nature of the additional training and/or further education which the individual undertakes, so that Ii  also
depends upon Qi . Because good quality careers guidance may involve avoiding unnecessary high costs
of some programmes of further training and education, Ii may not, however, be a simple increasing function
of Qi . When we incorporate the dependency of the relevant variable upon the quality of the careers
guidance into (2.4), we obtain:
(2.5)
We would expect that the net benefit of careers guidance to initially increase with the quality of the guidance
offered. Better quality careers guidance should be able to point the individual in the directions of greater
increases in the net present value of future increases in net earnings than poorer quality careers advice. In
addition, good quality careers advice may initially be feasible without significant increases in its costs of
provision compared to those involved in the provision of poorer quality careers advice. Similarly, it may
discover more appropriate avenues of additional training or further education from the individual concerned
for the same, or lower, level of public subsidy. All these factors will make the net benefit, NBi , of the
careers guidance to be an increasing function of the quality of the careers guidance over an initial range of
increasing quality, as in Figure 2.2 below.13
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FIGURE 2.2
However, after some point, we might expect diminishing returns to set in, causing the additional 
net present value of future earnings which results from increases in the quality of careers guidance to
become smaller in value. Achieving successive increases in this net present value may involve more
expensive programmes of training and/or further education that cause Ii to increase with Qi after some
point. Providing higher quality of careers guidance after any initial inefficiencies and ineffective forms of
guidance have been eliminated may also involve increasing costs of provision. These factors mean that at
some optimal level of quality, Qi*, the net benefit of the careers guidance is likely to reach its maximum
value NBi (Qi*), as in Figure 2.2.14
NPVMi 
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FIGURE 2.3
At the optimal level of quality, NPVMi , i.e. the net present value of the marginal increases in the
individual’s future net income that greater quality of careers guidance yields, can be shown to be equal to
MCQi , the marginal cost of greater quality in the careers guidance, plus MCDi  , the marginal cost of the
subsidy for any additional training or further education for the individual that results from the additional
quality of careers guidance, as in Figure 2.3. The maximum value NBi (Qi*) of the net benefit that is
attained when the quality of the careers guidance is at its optimal level can then be used as a benchmark
by which to compare the outcomes achieved by different careers guidance service providers for this type
of individual. It also forms an essential part of a cost-benefit analysis of the net benefits that result from
providing optimal levels of quality of careers guidance to individual advisees.
This implies that careers guidance service providers should record and monitor as far as possible the
levels of income that the individual advisee is likely to receive over their future years if no careers guidance
is given, and the levels of income they are likely to receive if they follow the careers guidance, net of any15
additional job-related expenditures they are likely to incur, together with the costs of the careers
guidance and the subsidy element of any additional training or further education that the individual will
undergo as a result of the careers guidance. Predictions of the levels of future income that the individual
might achieve as a result of their careers advice might draw upon statistical databases, such as that provided
by the New Earnings Survey (DfEE, 1998).
 
In order to make this process operational, however, recognition needs also to be given to the different
factors which impact upon the maximum value NBi (Qi*) that are outside the control of individual
careers guidance service providers. These factors will include:
i. the general state of the economy, nationally, regionally and locally, in the current and future time
periods, as measured by relevant economic indicators, such as national, regional and local rates of
unemployment and vacancies in occupations relevant to the careers prospects of the individual advisee.
ii. the initial skills, education, training and aptitudes of the individual i to whom careers guidance is
being given.
The development of a systematic database of these variables would facilitate the assessment of the relative
efficiency and effectiveness of different careers guidance providers in generating improvements in the
future time paths of net earnings, and associated human capital, of their advisees, adjusted for differences
across individual providers and over time in the above exogenous factors. There are a number of statistical
techniques which could be used in this assessment, such as multivariate regression analysis (see e.g.
Mayston and Jesson, 1999), stochastic frontier analysis (see e.g. Mayston, 2002), and Data
Envelopment Analysis (see e.g. Mayston and Jesson, 1988). Such an assessment could assist both in
the evaluation of the relative efficiency and effectiveness of individual careers guidance providers and in the
identification of best practice value for money in the provision of high quality careers guidance.16
3. INDIVIDUAL CAREER DECISIONS AND THE VALUE OF CAREERS GUIDANCE
3a. Careers Decisions Under Uncertainty
An important further dimension of investment in human capital that has implications for the evaluation of the
quality of careers guidance is that of  risk and uncertainty. Investment in human capital in the form of
additional training or further education or other significant changes in career direction may involve a large
element of sunk cost that cannot easily be recovered if wrong career choices are made. Such investment,
however, typically takes place in the presence of some significant degree of uncertainty at the time the
initial investment decision is made about the future outcomes and future degree of success of the
investment decision. Whilst the costs of the additional training or further education may be ascertained with
reasonable certainty, the probability of  any given individual advisee achieving any given target level
of success in completing the training or education, given the individual advisee’s  initial skills, education,
training and aptitudes, needs to be carefully assessed by the careers guidance provider in formulating their
careers advice. We would expect in general higher quality careers guidance to be characterised by more
accurate assessments of the chances of success of individual advisees in achieving different possible
levels of performance in additional training and education, and in helping to equip individual advisees with
the motivation and preparation to have a high probability of success in the goals they chose following
the careers guidance.
Similarly, we would expect high quality careers guidance to be characterised by more accurate assessments
of the likely economic prospects for career moves in different possible directions. The sunk cost nature of
many investments in human capital means that the foregone earnings and other costs that may be incurred
in undertaking new training or education in the hope of long-term career betterment may prove to be a
costly mistake if the anticipated  boost to future net income does not occur, because of economy-wide,
industry-specific, or other reasons.  These costs will also typically involve a large element of opportunity
costs, through the individual devoting scarce time in additional training and further education or other career
changes, which might otherwise have been invested more productively with greater long-term gains, had
higher quality careers guidance have been given.17
Another important feature of investment in human capital by an individual is that it typically involves a high
level of specific, undiversifiable, risk. An investor in the Stock Exchange is able to spread their risk
over many different shares through diversifying their individual portfolio. As a result they need only bear
general systematic risk that results from economy-wide uncertainties, through holding a market
portfolio of shares, such as through an index fund, in combination with a riskless asset, as in the Capital
Asset Pricing Model of finance theory (see Brealey and Myers, 2000). In contrast, an individual investing
in their own specialised human capital, makes more specific investments in particular skills and
knowledge acquisition that make them exposed to many specific factors that affect particular jobs and
industries. As a result, high quality careers guidance needs to be able to inform individual careers
advisees of the nature of these specific risks which they will face as a result of investing in particular need
skills and specialised knowledge. In addition, high quality careers guidance needs to be able individuals
advice on how to manage these risks, such as through making investments in training and qualifications
which will give the individual flexibility to later change jobs and/or careers if an initial choice does prove
to be less rewarding than initially anticipated.
The importance of both uncertainty and high quality careers guidance are reinforced also by the time lag
which is likely to occur between the initial decision to make new investments in human capital and the pay-
off time when the full benefits of the investment are realised. In a stylised Arrow-Debreu world of
economic theory, individuals could in advance of their investment  enter into forward contracts with known
pay-offs from their planned investment in additional training or further education, given different future
circumstances, to deliver their labour in advance for a price which is agreed in advance. However, in
practice, employment contracts are often only available once the initial investment in new human capital has
been made. In the meantime, the pay-off from the investment may change due to many economy-wide and
career specific changes taking place during the time lag. High quality careers guidance plays an important
role in providing the individual career advisee with information with which they can form realistic
expectations of the future changes in net income which are likely to result from different possible career
moves.
The careers guidance also needs to take a broad view of economic trends and changes which will
influence future levels of wages resulting from different career moves. Moreover it needs to take account18
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also of the additional complication that the level of future wages for a given career depends upon how many
individuals across the economy as a whole are advised and attracted to move into it. If a career initially
looks very attractive, many individuals may invest in pursing it, so that by they time they qualify there is an
excess supply of qualified individuals chasing the available jobs. As a result, their earnings may be
depressed below their expected level, and the rate of return on their investment in human capital prove
to be lower than anticipated. In the limit, this may produce a cob-web cycle where the relevant labour
market goes from high wages to low wages, and then with a lag back to high wages as the supply of new
recruits dries up in the face of low wages. Being able to identify cases where there is this danger arguably
forms part of  high quality careers guidance.  
We may incorporate risk and uncertainty into our analysis of the benefits of careers guidance through the
concept of expected utility, using the tools of decision analysis (See Bunn, 1984; French, 1989). If net
income is again the only variable which the individual careers recipient values, we may define a utility of
income function Ui t (Yi t). If the individual is averse to risk, this will have a shape similar to the curve
in Figure 3.1 below. 
FIGURE 3.119
The slope of the curve in Figure 3.1 corresponds to the marginal utility of income, which in Figure 3.1
is positive, but declining, so that the individual is better off with more income, but has diminishing
marginal utility of income. This property implies the individual is risk averse, so that whilst increases
in income make the individual better off, a given absolute increase in income does not increase the
individual’s utility level as much as a fall in income of the same absolute amount would lower the individual’s
utility level. One important example of such a utility of income function is that given by taking the natural
logarithm of income, i.e.
                         Ui t (Yi t) = log Yi t                                                                                     (3.1)
which has the property that the marginal utility of income is given by 1/Yi t , which diminishes as Yi t
increases, and which tends to zero as income rises infinitely, and becomes very large when income falls
close to zero, reflecting the large loss of utility the individual suffers if their income drops to a very low level.
The use of (3.1) also has the advantage that it may be readily computed for any given value toYi t . If the
individual is not risk averse, but simply risk neutral, we may simply make use here of Yi t  as indicating
the pay-off to the individual at time t, i.e.
                             Ui t (Yi t) = Yi t                                                                                                  (3.2)
We may now proceed to analyse the value of careers guidance to an individual advisee. To do so,
we need first to recognise that some individuals may make a career move even in the absence of careers
guidance. For the sake of simplicity, we will consider a two-period analysis in which if the individual makes
the career move career move they must incur at time t = 0 an initial investment cost of Ii , which may
includes foregone earnings during a period of additional training or further education, and/or costs of
relocation to search for a new job in a different geographic area. If the investment in the career move
proves to be successful, the individual will receive a new higher level of net income, equal to Ys
i1 , at time
t = 1. If it proves to be unsuccessful, they will receive a lower level of net income, equal to Y
f
i t . The
chances of their being successful in the absence of a detailed assessment of their skills, aptitudes and
abilities by a careers adviser are given by the probability ps
i , with the chances of their being unsuccessful




















The expected benefit which the individual faces in the absence of careers guidance if they do  make the
career move is given by:
                  Ea(Um
i) =  ps
i .Us
i  + ( 1 - ps
i ).Uf 
i                                                                                      (3.3)
where Us
i =  Ui o (Yo
i o  - Is
i ) + Ui 1 (Ys
i 1 )   and  Uf
i =   Ui o (Yo
i o  - Is
i ) + Ui 1 (Yf 
i 1 )
and where we assume any time preference is embodied within the utility function at each point in time.
If in the absence of careers guidance they  do not make the career move, they will stay their levels of
income, Yo
i o , and Yo
i 1 in these two periods of time, with a resultant utility level with certainty of:
                      Uo
i = Ui o (Yo
i o ) + Ui 1 (Yo
i 1 )                                                                       (3.4)
The overall position  in the absence of careers guidance is illustrated in Figure 3.2 below.
FIGURE 3.2
A numerical example of Figure 3.2 is one where the probability of success in the career move without21
careers guidance, is 40 per cent, i.e. ps
i  = 0.4, the level of net income of the individual if they do not make
the career move is Yo
i o =  Yo
i 1 = £10,000, the initial investment cost in making the career move  is £2,000,
and the level of income which they will receive if the career move succeeds is Ys
i 1 = £19,000, whilst the
if they do not succeed they will have net income of  Yf 
i 1 = £10,000 in period one. If the individual is risk
neutral with zero time preference, we have from equations (3.2) and  (3.3) an expected benefit if they make
the career move of:
                  Ea(Um
i) = 0.4 (£8,000 + £19,000) + 0.6 (£8,000 + £10,000) = £21,600            (3.5)
If the individual does not make the career move, they receive Yo
i o =  Yo
i 1 = £10,000 in both periods, with
a total benefit from (3.2) and (3.4) of:
                         Uo
i = £20,000                                                                                             (3.6)
implying that the individual would be better off here making the career move.
3b. The Value of Perfect Careers Guidance
We may now consider the case of perfect careers guidance, which we define here in terms of the careers
guidance interview, and any related tests, being able to fully assess the abilities, skills and attributes of the
individual so that as a result of this assessment the individual can be accurately advised as to whether or
not they will succeed in the career move. We will also assume that perfect careers guidance can accurately
assess the future state of the economy, so as to be able to perfectly predict the payoff, Ys
i1 , the individual
advisee will receive if they do make a successful career move, as well as being able to accurately assess
the  investment cost Ii which they will incur in undertaking the career move. The advantage of such careers
guidance is that the individual may defer their career decision until they have received this guidance, which
as in Figure 3.3 below, is assumed to result in either a positive assessment of the suitability of the individual
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FIGURE 3.3
If the individual receives a positive assessment, they may proceed to make their career decision  in the
knowledge that the career move will be successful. Since the payoff, Us
i , the individual receives if the
career move is successful exceeds the payoff, Uo
i , the individual receives if they do not make the career
move, the individual will decide here to make the career move, with a resultant payoff of Us
i .  If, however,
the individual receives a negative assessment, they will proceed to make their career decision  in the
knowledge that the career move will be unsuccessful. Since the payoff, Uf
i , the individual receives if the
career move is unsuccessful is lower than the payoff, Uo
i , the individual receives if they do not make the
career move, the individual will decide here not to make the career move, with a resultant payoff of Uo
i .
The expected benefit to the individual advisee if they seek the careers guidance then depends upon the
probability of their receiving a positive assessment. Before the detailed assessment of their aptitudes, skills23
and abilities by the careers service, which will then discover whether or not they will be successful, this
probability is ps
i , the probability of their being successful in the absence of detailed careers assessment of
whether or not they will succeed in the career move. The expected benefit to the individual advisee if they
seek the perfect careers guidance is then:
                Eg
P  (Ui )  = ps
i . Us
i     + (1 -  ps
i ) . Uo
i                                                                  (3.7)
In our above numerical example, we have ps
i = 0.4,  Us
i    = (£8,000 + £19,000) = £27,000, and U
o
i =
£20,000. Hence in this example:
              Eg
P  (Ui )  = 0.4 . £27,000     + 0.6 . £20,000  =  £22,800                                        (3.8)
                                               
The value, or expected net benefit, of the perfect careers guidance in this case is then £1,200. It is equal
to the difference between the expected benefit of £21,600 in (3.5) of their career decision without the
careers guidance and their expected benefit of £22,800  if they seek the careers guidance. In this example,
the net benefit from the careers guidance results from the individual avoiding  making the careers investment
of £2,000 in those cases where they would not make a success of the career move, with these cases
occurring with a probability of 0.6. 
In other cases, the value of the careers guidance derives from the individual making a beneficial career
move they would not otherwise have made. Thus if the investment cost in making the career move had been
£4,000, we would have:
                  Ea(Um
i) = 0.4 (£6,000 + £19,000) + 0.6 (£6,000 + £10,000) = £19,600           (3.9)
and instead the individual would not have made the career move, but instead would have remained with
the benefit of U
o
i = £20,000 in (3.6) from not making the career move. The benefit from the careers
guidance if the investment cost rises to £4,000 would now be:24
                   Eg
P  (Ui )  = 0.4 . £25,000     + 0.6 . £20,000  = £22,000                                  (3.10)
This exceeds the benefit of Uo
i = £20,000 in (3.6) from not making the career move by £2,000, so that the
expected net benefit from the careers guidance improving the individual’s career choice is now
equal to £2,000. This in turn equals the net gain of £5,000 (= £9,000 - £4,000) which the individual makes
from their investment in the career move if they receive a positive assessment times the probability of 0.4
of their receiving a positive assessment in the careers guidance.  
More generally, the value, VPG, of the perfect careers guidance to an individual who seeks the careers
guidance is equal to the difference between their expected benefit, Eg (Ui ),  with the perfect careers
guidance, and their expected benefit, Ea (Ui ), in the absence of the careers guidance, i.e.
                    VPGi =  Eg
P  (Ui ) - Ea (Ui )                                                                           (3.11)
where  Eg
P  (Ui ) is given by equation (3.7), and where:
             
               Ea (Ui ) = Ea(Um
i ) if the individual makes the career move                                 (3.12)
and        Ea (Ui ) = Uo
i   if the individual does not make the career move                           (3.13)
in the absence of careers guidance.
If the individual is correctly informed regarding the value of ps
i , and the payoffs and investment costs
associated from the career move,  we will have: 
                       Ea (Ui ) = max ( Ea(Um
i) ,  Uo
i )                                                                  (3.14)
with the individual deciding on the career move according to whether or not it will increase their expected25
benefit calculated using these correct values.
3c. The Value of Imperfect Careers Guidance
Whilst perfect careers guidance may be a useful benchmark for comparing performance, the careers
guidance offered in practice may not provide a perfect assessment of the skills, abilities and aptitudes of
the individual for meeting the needs of the proposed career move. Instead, the imperfect careers guidance
would give a positive assessment to the individual, even when the individual possesses the attributes which
would lead them to succeed in the career move, in less than 100 per cent of such cases, so that the chances
of the imperfect careers guidance correctly identifying that the individual has the attributes to succeed in the
career move is only 
                     0 <  pi (P*S ) < 1.0                                                                                     (3.15)
with a positive probability, pi (N*S ) = 1 -   pi (P*S ) > 0, of the imperfect careers guidance giving a
negative assessment to the individual even though they have the attributes to succeed in the career move.
Similarly, imperfect careers guidance would have a probability,   pi (N*F ), less than one hundred per cent
of give a negative assessment to individuals with attributes that would lead then not to make a success of
the career move. There is then a positive probability, pi (P*F ) = 1 -  pi (N*F ) > 0, of the imperfect careers
guidance giving a positive assessment to the individual even though they do not have the attributes to
succeed in the career move.
As a result of such imperfect careers guidance, the probability, pi (S*P), of the individual succeeding in the
career move following a positive assessment by the careers guidance service  is now less than one. Rather,
there is some positive probability  pi (F*P ) =  (1- pi (S*P) ) of the individual failing in the career move even
if they are given a positive assessment. Similarly, imperfect careers guidance means that the probability, pi
(F*N ), of an individual who has received a negative assessment failing in the career move is less than one.
Rather, there is some probability,  pi (S*N ) =  (1- pi (F*N) ) , of the individual who receives a negative
assessment succeeding in the career move if they attempt it. 26
From Bayes’ theorem (see Bunn, 1984), we may compute:
          pi (S*P) = ps
i . pi (P*S ) / [ ps
i . pi (P*S ) + ( 1 -  ps
i ) .pi (P*F )]                                 (3.16)
and    pi (S*N) = ps
i . pi (N*S ) / [ ps
i . pi (N*S ) + ( 1 -  ps
i ) .pi (N*F )]                               (3.17)
with the overall probability of the individual receiving a positive assessment given by:
               pi (P) = pi (P*S ) . ps
i  +  pi (P*F ) . ( 1 - ps
i )                                                        (3.18) 
and  the overall probability of the individual receiving a negative assessment given by:
             pi (N) = pi (N*S ) . ps
i  +  pi (N*F ) . ( 1 - ps
i ) = 1 - pi (P)                                       (3.19)
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The individual making their career choice is now faced with poorer quality information and advice as a
result of the imperfect careers guidance. If they are given a positive career assessment, rather than face a
known payoff from a career move of Us
i ,  the career move has an uncertain  expected benefit of:
             Em ( Ui  *P ) =   pi (S*P).  Us
i   +   pi (F*P). Uf
i    < Us
i                                         (3.20)
which will result in the individual deciding against the career move if  Em ( Ui  *P ) is less than Uo
i , and a
lower expected benefit than the value of  U
s
i which they would have had if they had received a positive
assessment under perfect careers guidance. careers advice.
Compared to perfect careers advice,  imperfect careers advice has the following disbenefits which will28
reduce its value compared to prefect careers advice:
a. When given a positive recommendation to make a career move, some individual advisees will decide
not to make the career move because they know that there is some positive probability, here of pi (F*P)
, of the career move failing to be a success for them, even though they have received a positive
recommendation to make the move. As a result, they will lose the chance of the benefit,  Us
i , which they
would have received had the career move been a success for them, but instead remain with the smaller
payoff, Uo
i , from not making the career move. This will result in a Type I error of the individual rejecting
the career move even though it would have been beneficial for them.
b.  When given a positive recommendation to make a career move, some individual advisees will decide
to make the career move, but will find later that the career move was not successful for them, but instead
has the worse outcome Uf
i . They will then have incurred the investment cost involved in the career move
following the positive recommendation from the careers guidance, but not received a positive return on this
investment. This will result in a Type II error of the individual investing in the career move even
though it is unsuitable for them.
 
c.   When given a negative recommendation to make a career move, some individuals will decide to make
the career move because they know that there is some positive probability, here equal to pi (S*N), less than
one that they may still be successful, but will find later that the career move is not successful for them,
ending up with the worse outcome Uf
i . This will be a further source of a Type II error, of the individual
investing in the career move even though it is unsuitable for them.
d.   When given a negative recommendation to make a career move, some individuals will decide not to
make the career move, even though there is a positive probability, here equal to pi (S*N), that they may
still be successful. Because the imperfect careers guidance cannot distinguish perfectly between individuals
who will be successful in the career move and those who will be unsuccessful, it will give a negative
assessment to some who would have been successful in the career move. As a result, those individuals who
decide not to make the career move because of the negative assessment they have been given, even though
they would have been successful in the career move, lose out on the benefit,  Us
i , they would have29
received, and instead stay with the smaller payoff, Uo
i , from not making the career move.  This will be a
further source of a Type I error of the individual rejecting the career move even though it would have been
beneficial for them.
The cost, or dis-benefit, of making a Type I error is given by the loss of the potential benefit:
                              Us
i  - Uo
i                                                                                             (3.21)          
the individual would have gained had they made the career move when they had the attributes to be
successful in it. The cost, or dis-benefit, of making a Type II error is given by the loss of the  benefit
from not making the career move compared to unsuccessfully investing in the career move:
                               Uo
i  - Uf
i                                                                                             (3.22)         
 
when the individual does not have the attributes to be successful in it.
The extent and frequency of the dis-benefits from the imperfect careers guidance will be a reflection of the
quality of the careers guidance offered. The highest quality careers guidance will be that corresponding to
the case of perfect careers guidance whose expected net benefit is computed above, and where the risk
of Type I and Type II errors is zero for those individuals who seek the careers guidance. An important
index of the quality of the careers guidance offered will be the expected net benefit it achieves, and how
close the imperfect careers guidance gets to the expected net benefits which would be achieved
by perfect careers guidance. The index of quality, Qi , of the careers guidance given to individual
i may then be expressed as:
             I (Qi ) = VIGi / VPGi = [Eg
I  (Ui ) - Ea (Ui ) ] / [Eg
P  (Ui ) - Ea (Ui ) ]                      (3.23)
           where Eg
I  (Ui ) = pi (P) . E(Ui *P ) +  pi (N) . E(Ui *N )                                          (3.24) 30
                  E(Ui *P ) = max (Em ( Ui  *P ), Uo
i ) ,  E(Ui *N ) = max (Em ( Ui  *N ), Uo
i )     (3.25)
so that the individual’s expected utility, given a positive assessment, is the higher of their expected utility in
(3.20) if they decide to make the career move as a result of a positive assessment, and the utility level, Uo
i
, they would achieve without the career move, and similarly for a negative assessment.  
We can see the effects of lower quality careers guidance on the magnitude of the expected net benefits from
the careers guidance also in terms of our earlier numerical example. As noted above, imperfect careers
guidance involves a less than one hundred per cent reliability rate in the careers guidance giving the
individual a positive assessment when the individual advisee does have the attributes to succeed in the
career move. If this reliability rate is only 80 per cent, this implies: 
                   pi (P*S) = 0.8                                                                                               (3.26)
Similarly, imperfect careers guidance involves a less than one hundred per cent reliability rate in the careers
guidance giving the individual a negative assessment when the individual advisee does not have the attributes
to succeed in the career move. If  this reliability rate is only 75 per cent, this implies: 
                  pi (N*F) = 0.75                                                                                              (3.27)
From equations (3.16) - (3.19) above, and our earlier example where the overall probability of success
in the career move was 0.4, we have as an implication of these less than 100 per cent reliability rates by
the imperfect careers guidance that:
            pi (S*P) = 0.681, pi (F*P) = 0.319,  pi (S*N) = 0.151, pi (F*N) = 0.849                (3.28)
i.e. the chances of an individual being successful in the career move if given a positive careers guidance
assessment are now only 68.1 per cent, whereas they were previously 100 per cent under the perfect
careers guidance. 15.1 per cent of the career advisees would still have succeeded despite being given a
negative assessment under the imperfect careers guidance. In addition we have:31
                          pi (P) = 0.47, pi ( N) = 0.53                                                                    (3.29)
so that the overall probability of an individual being given a positive assessment has risen from the value of
0.4 which it would have been under perfect careers guidance to 0.47 under this example of imperfect
careers guidance, and that of a negative assessment has fallen from 0.6 under perfect careers guidance to
0.53. Whilst the individual has a higher chance of being given a positive assessment and recommendation
of making the career move under the imperfect careers guidance,  the accuracy rate of a positive
assessment correctly implying that the individual has the attributes for success in the career move is,
however, only 68.1 per cent.
In order to compute the expected net benefit from the imperfect careers guidance, we must work
backwards through the tree in Figure 3.4 to assess which career decisions the individual would have made
when faced with these new probabilities of success following a positive or negative assessment by the
careers guidance. From (3.2), if the individual careers advisee receives a positive assessment from the
careers guidance, the individual has an expected payoff from making the career move of:
Em (Ui  *P) = pi (S*P).Us
i  + pi (F*P).Uf
i  = (0.681) . £25,000 + (0.319). £16,000 = £22,130 (3.30)   
                          
where the payoff is Us
i = [£6,000 + £19,000] as previously if the career move is successful, and 
the payoff is Uf
i = [ £6,000 + £10,000]  as previously if the career move is unsuccessful .Since the resultant
expected value of £22,130 exceeds the payoff of Uo
i = £20,000 from not making the career move, the
individual will chose to make the career move when given a positive assessment. However, under imperfect
careers guidance, there is now a much higher probability, of 0.319 rather than zero, of the careers move
actually working out to be unsuccessful for the individual even though they received a positive assessment
and recommendation to make the career move.
The individual has an expected payoff from making the career move if they receive a negative assessment
from the careers guidance of:32
Em (Ui  *N) = pi (S*N).Us
i  + pi (F*N).Uf
i  = (0151) .£25,000 + (0.849).£16,000 = £17,359 (3.31)  
which is lower than the payoff of Uo
i = £20,000 from not making the career move, so that the individual
will chose here not to make the career move if given a negative assessment, thereby giving up some chance
of making a successful career move under the imperfect careers guidance.
Given the overall probabilities of 0.47 and 0.53 of receiving a positive, or negative, assessment from the
imperfect careers guidance in this example, the overall expected benefit from the imperfect careers
guidance is:
                          Eg
I (Ui )  = (0.47) . £22,130     + (0.53) . £20,000  = £21,000                   (3.32)
         
The value, VIG, of the imperfect careers guidance to an individual who seeks the careers guidance
is equal to the difference between their expected benefit,  Eg
I (Ui ),  with the imperfect careers guidance,
and their expected benefit, Ea (Ui ), in the absence of the careers guidance, i.e.
                            VIGi  =  Eg
I  (Ui ) - Ea (Ui ) = £21,000 - £20,000 = £1,000                    (3.33)
where Ea (Ui ) = £20,000 as previously. The value of the imperfect careers guidance is still  positive, and
better than no careers guidance. Without careers guidance, the individual would have rated their chances
of success in the career move at only ps
i = 0.40, i.e. 40 per cent. With a positive assessment from the
careers guidance, their chances of success are 0.681, i.e. 68.1 per cent. However, this is still substantially
short of their 100 per cent chances of success in the career move if they had received a positive assessment
under perfect careers guidance.
Indeed, compared to the perfect careers guidance, which had a value of £2,000 to the individual in (3.10),
the effect of the lower quality of the imperfect careers guidance is to halve its value to only £1,000. This
halving in value, moreover, results from the fall in the reliability of the careers guidance, from 100 per cent
to 80 per cent for a positive assessment, and from 100 per cent to 75 per cent for a negative assessment,
which some might consider to be still fairly high reliability rates. However, lower reliability of the careers33
guidance may result in individuals making costly investments in unsuccessful career moves which
they would not have incurred in the absence of a positive careers guidance assessment. Even
lower reliability rates than 80 per cent and 75 per cent for the careers guidance would result in even lower
expected net benefits. 
The index of quality of the careers guidance offered to individual i from (3.23) is:
                 I(Qi ) = VIGi  / VPGi = £1,000 / £2,000 = 50 per cent                                      (3.34)
The above discussion highlights the following key points:
i. the value of careers guidance must be determined relative to the expected payoff the individual would
achieve in the absence of the careers guidance. Thus the fact that some individuals make beneficial career
moves following careers guidance is not sufficient to establish the value of the careers guidance. Instead,
the value needs to be determined relative to the career choices they would have made in the absence of
the careers guidance.
ii. a  large part of the benefit from the careers guidance is likely to come from the encouragement it gives
to individuals who could benefit from the career move to make a career move they would not otherwise
have made this decision, if they had not received a positive assessment from the careers guidance that gave
them the confidence to undertake the investment cost without much fear of it not paying off for them. This
involves reducing the frequency of Type I errors of individuals rejecting career moves for which they
have the attributes to succeed and which would have been beneficial to them.
 
iii. a further part of the value of the careers guidance in the above analysis comes from enabling the
individual advisee to avoid costly investments in career moves which do not payoff for the individual, as a
result of the careers guidance making an assessment of their suitability for the career move. If this
assessment is reliable, the individual advisee can make a career choice without much risk of undertaking
a costly investment in a career move which fails to payoff. Part of the net benefit of the careers guidance
then comes from reducing the frequency of Type II errors by helping individual advisees to avoid costly34
investments in career moves which they would have made in the absence of the careers advice, but which
are unlikely to pay off for them.
iv. the expected net benefit from the careers guidance may well be significantly reduced by a lower
level of reliability in its ability to identify the attributes in the individual advisee which will contribute
towards success in the career move.
3d. The Cost of Inaccurate Careers guidance Information
                                                    
Imperfect careers guidance may involve not only imperfect assessments of the suitability of any given
individual advisee for making a success of the investment required for a particular career move. It may also
involve inaccuracies in the information given to the advisee as to the magnitude of the changes in net income
which they will receive if they are successful in the career move. Thus the careers guidance might that
predict the net income which the individual will receive if they are successful in the career move is Y
sg
 i t
rather than its true value of Ys
 i t , and Yf g 
i t   if they are unsuccessful, rather than the true value of Yf
 i t.  In
addition the imperfect careers guidance may predict the investment cost which the individual must incur to
make the career move to be Ig
i rather than its true value of Ii .
Such inaccurate information is likely to change the decisions of some individuals in Figure 3.4 as to whether
or not to undertake the career move following a careers assessment. An inaccurately high estimate of the
net income which will result from making the career move if the initial investment in it is successful, or an
inaccurately low estimate of the cost of the investment required, is likely to induce more individuals to
undertake it than if the information had been accurate. Similarly, an inaccurately low estimate of the net
income which will result from making the career move if the initial investment in it is unsuccessful, or an
inaccurately high estimate of the cost of the investment required, is likely to dissuade more individuals from
undertaking the career move than if the information had been accurate.
There is then a greater risk of Type I and Type II errors than if the information had been accurate. The
cost of such inaccurate information is equal to the increased frequency such inaccuracy produces in35
the occurrence of the Type I and Type II errors times the respective costs of these Type I and Type
II errors, as given by equations (3.21) and (3.22) above. The accurate assessment of these costs in
equations (3.21) and (3.22) itself requires accurate information on the magnitude of the investment costs
in undertaking the career move, the level of the net income the individual would receive if they did not make
the career move and its associated investment, the future net income which the individual would receive if
they were successful  in the career move, and the future net income which the individual would receive if
they were unsuccessful  in the career move.  
3e. The Effect of Multiple Possible Career Moves
In the above analysis we have considered the case where the subject for discussion and assessment by the
careers guidance interview is one possible career move. In the case of perfect careers guidance, the career
move being considered would be the one which is optimal for the individual advisee. We may define such
an optimal career move as the one which would maximise the individual’s utility level, Us
i , from the
resultant flow of net income that the optimal career move generates, chosen from amongst all possible
career moves for which the individual would be given a positive assessment as to their suitability to succeed.
Thus even though there may be multiple possible career moves for the individual, our above analysis for
the case of perfect careers guidance still holds when we interpret Us
i in this way. The utility level, Uo
i ,
which the individual would attain without the career move is the one the individual would choose from all
possible careers open to the individual, if the individual did not make use of the advice on offer from the
careers guidance.
In the case of imperfect careers guidance, there is a risk that the careers guidance may imperfectly assess
the suitability of any given individual advisee for a particular career move. In addition, there is a risk that
the information given by imperfect careers guidance  on the changes in net income that result from a given
career move will be inaccurate. As a result, when there are multiple possible career moves which might be
the subject of consideration in the careers guidance interview, there is a risk that the individual will chose
a career move which is not the optimal career move for them.36
We may again, however, formulate the analysis in terms of the risks of Type I and Type II errors occurring.
Our earlier definition of a Type I error being one where the individual rejects the career move even though
it would have been beneficial for them can now be modified in the case of  multiple possible career moves
to the following definition. A Type I error is now one where the individual does not undertake the
career move which would be optimal for them (as defined above) but instead selects a less beneficial
career option. This less beneficial career option may be making no career move at all compared to the
individual’s existing career. Alternatively, under imperfect careers guidance it may involve the choice of a
career move which is less suitable for the individual than their optimal career move, and hence results in a
lower utility level for the individual than their optimal career move would. 
We may now modify the calculation of the cost of a Type I error from that in equation (3.21) for the case
of a single possible career move to that for multiple possible career moves being:
                      Us
i  - Uj
i                                                                                                     (3.35)          
                                                                               
where Uj 
i  is the utility level of the individual when they succeed in the less beneficial career option j. This
is chosen by them in place of the optimal career move, when they are given less than fully accurate
information by the imperfect careers guidance.  Us
i   is the utility level they would have had if they had made
their optimal career choice and succeeded in it. The case j = 0 corresponds to the career option of making
no career move at all compared to remaining with the individual’s existing career. However, the cases j =
1, .. , J can correspond to other possible career moves the individual may make as a result of the imperfect
careers guidance.  Partly as a result of such Type I errors,  the imperfect careers guidance achieves a lower
level of expected net benefit than would perfect careers guidance, where the risk of Type I and Type II
errors occurring for the individuals who receive the perfect careers guidance is zero.                             
                                                 
In order to compute the overall expected net benefit lost through Type I errors from having imperfect
careers guidance, rather than perfect careers guidance, the relative frequency of individuals choosing each
of the different possible career options other than their optimal career moves, and succeeding in them,


















i ). h(Oj*ci, gi).m(ci, gi ) where gi ’ gi(Q)
same characteristics, in terms of initial skills, aptitudes and talents making the choice of the career option
Oj and succeeding in it, after receiving the careers guidance gi . ci  can here be a vector (i.e. a list or set )
of different characteristics of  the individual careers advisee which are relevant to their career choice. We
will denote by m (ci , g i ) the number of individuals with the particular set of characteristics ci  who receive
the imperfect careers guidance gi . The total expected net benefit lost 
 through Type I errors from
having imperfect careers guidance, rather than perfect careers guidance, for such individuals is
then:
                (3.36)       
                  
The overall expected net benefit lost through such Type I errors across all individuals who make
use of the imperfect careers guidance of quality level Q is given by summing (3.36) across all the
types of individual who make use of this careers guidance, i.e.
         (3.37)  
where the guidance gi given to individual i depends upon the quality, Q, of the careers service on offer.
When there is only one career move being considered, the cost, or dis-benefit, of making a Type II
error is given by the loss of the  benefit from not making the career move compared to unsuccessfully
investing in the career move:
                              Uo
i  - Uf
i                                                                                             (3.38)
as in equation (3.22). When there are several possible career moves, the extent of the cost of a Type I
error depends upon which of these possible career moves the individual chooses as a result of the imperfect


















i ). f (Oj*ci, gi).m(ci, gi ) where gi ’ gi(Q)
they unsuccessfully invest in this career move and it does not payoff for them , compared to not making a
career move and remaining with their existing career where their payoff would be U
o
i   . Instead they
receive only the payoff Uf j 
i   if they fail to be successful in their investment in career option j.  The extent
of the cost, or dis-benefit, of the Type II error is therefore:
                             Uo
i  - Uf j
i                                                                                             (3.39)
when the individual does not succeed in their chosen career option j .
In order to compute the overall expected net benefit lost through Type II errors from having
imperfect careers guidance, rather than perfect careers guidance, the relative frequency of individuals
choosing each of the different possible career options other than their optimal career moves, and failing to
succeeding in them, needs to be assessed. We will denote by f ( Oj * ci , gi  ) the relative frequency of an
individual with the same characteristics, in terms of initial skills, aptitudes and talents, making the  career
move to the career option Oj but failing to make a success of it, after receiving the careers guidance gi . The
total expected net benefit lost 
 through Type II errors from having imperfect careers guidance,
rather than perfect careers guidance, for individuals with these characteristics ci  is:
                       (3.40)
The overall expected net benefit lost through Type II errors across all individuals who make use
of the imperfect careers guidance is given by summing (3.40) across all the types of individual who
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A final difference between the benefits achieved under imperfect careers guidance and those which would
have been achieved under perfect careers guidance occurs for the following reason. Under perfect
careers guidance, more individuals are likely to make use of the careers service than under
imperfect careers guidance, because the expected net benefit to them of making use of the careers guidance
is likely to be greater. Because of this, less individuals will  make their own Type I errors, of not
undertaking a career move which would have been beneficial to them, through failing to make use of
careers guidance under perfect careers guidance than they would under imperfect careers guidance.
Similarly, less individuals will  make their own Type II errors, of unsuccessfully investing in career
moves which are unsuited to them, through failing to make use of careers guidance under perfect careers
guidance than they would under imperfect careers guidance.
The benefit of perfect careers guidance, compared to the imperfect careers guidance, gi ,  from this source
of reduction in Type I errors is then given by:
            (3.42)
where gi = gi (Q) and  h ( Oj * ci , ai ) is the relative frequency of an individual with the characteristics ci
making the choice of the career option Oj and succeeding in it, in the absence of careers guidance. The
term m(ci , gp
 i ) denotes the number of individuals who would make use of the perfect careers guidance
if it was available to them.
Similarly, the benefit of perfect careers guidance, compared to the imperfect careers guidance,  gi , from
this source of reduction in Type II errors is given by: 
           (3.43)40
where g i = g i (Q) and f (Oj *ci , ai ) is the relative frequency of an individual with the characteristics ci
making the choice of the career option Oj and not succeeding in it, in the absence of careers guidance.
3f. The Effect of Under-Informed Potential Careers Guidance Advisees
We also need to assess the significance of individuals in the population at large, who are potential careers
guidance advisees, themselves being under-informed as to the potential benefits and chances of success
of careers moves which they might make. Such lack of information will in part be reflected in inaccurate
assessments which they themselves make in the absence of careers guidance of their own
chances of success if they were to make any given career move and of the net income they would
receive if they did make such career moves. Thus, in terms of their own decision tree in Figure 3.5
below, the subjective estimates, ps’
i , which they of their own chance of success of a given career move,
may be out of line with estimates based upon more objective information. Similarly, their subjective
assessments, Us’
i  , of the payoffs to them if they were to succeed and of the payoff, Usf’
i , to them if they
were to be unsuccessful in their investment in the career move, may be out of line with the actual payoffs,
Us
i and Usf
i , they would  receive if they made the career move.
As a result of such inaccurate assessments, there is likely to be an increased risk that the individuals
themselves will,  in the absence of careers guidance, make a Type I error. This will result from them
not undertaking a career move they could have made a success of and which would have been beneficial
to them. Similarly, there may be an increased risk that they will, in the absence of careers guidance,
make a Type II error. This will result from their undertaking a career move which does not prove





The effects of these increased risks of under-informed individuals making their own Type I and Type II
errors in the absence of careers guidance is the following. The first  is to increase the total expected net
benefit from good quality careers guidance compared to the individuals receiving no careers
guidance. The number of individuals, h ( Oj * ci , ai ) , who, in the absence of good quality careers
guidance, make career choices, such as  Oj , which are not optimal for them, even though they succeed in
them, and for which there is therefore still  a Type I error, will be greater in (3.42) when these individuals
are more under-informed. Similarly, the number of individuals, f ( Oj * ci , ai ) , who, in the absence of good
quality careers guidance, make career choices, such as  Oj , which are not optimal for them, and in which
they do not succeed with a resultant Type II error, will be greater in (3.43) when these individuals are more
under-informed.  
However, a second effect of more under-informed individuals in the population at large may be to make
them less aware of the potential benefits of them making use of good quality careers guidance.
This will tend to reduce the size of both h ( Oj * ci , gi ) in equation (3.37) and  f ( Oj * ci , gi ) in equation
(3.41). The overall effect of a more under-informed population on the net benefits from the careers
guidance will depend upon the relative strength of these two effects.42
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3g. The Total Benefit from Perfect and Imperfect Careers Guidance
Perfect careers guidance by definition results in all the individuals who make use of the careers guidance
being perfectly assessed as to their suitability to succeed in different possible career moves and receiving
advice as to their optimal career move, which the individual advisee can then invest in knowing that they
will succeed in it.  The total benefit from giving perfect careers guidance to individual i is then equal to the
payoff, Us
i , which each individuals with characteristics c i receive when they succeed in their
optimal career choice less the cost Ci (Q 
p
i ) of providing the careers guidance to individual i at
this perfect level of quality. For the sake of simplicity, we will ignore here any external subsidy element
which is involved in any additional training or education.  The total benefit from giving perfect careers
guidance to all individuals who receive it is equal to the total net benefit to individual i times the number of
individuals  m(ci , gp
 i ) with the characteristics ci who make use of the perfect careers guidance, summed
over all the types of individual who use the careers guidance. We therefore have:
                       (3.44)
To compute the total net benefit from providing perfect careers guidance, rather than providing
no careers guidance, we must subtract from (3.44) the total benefit, TBA, which individuals would have
received in the absence of any careers guidance. This will equal:
(3.45)
                           (3.46)
                          (3.47)
The first component, uo
i , in the square bracket of (3.45) in the computation of TBA reflects the baseline43
net income which all individuals with characteristics ci receive if they make no career move. M(ci ) is the
total number of individuals in the population who have the characteristics ci. The second component, Ni1
, in (3.45) and (3.46) reflects the increased payoff above this baseline which those individuals with
characteristics ci receive if they succeed in each of the difference possible career moves they might make.
The third component, Ni 2 , of (3.45) and (3.47) reflects the loss in net income below the baseline level
which individual who invest in career moves but are unsuccessful in them suffer. The term dj
i reflects the
subsidy element which the career move j by individual i involves.
The total benefit, TB(Q), from imperfect careers guidance of quality Q is equal to that from perfect
careers guidance less the cost, or dis-benefit, associated with the increased Type I and Type II errors
discussed above, i.e.
              TB(Q) = TB(Qp) - NBL1 (Q) - NBL2 (Q) - NBL3 (Q) - NBL4 (Q)                      (3.48)
where NBL1 (Q) and NBL2 (Q) are the increased losses which arise from those individuals who use the
imperfect careers guidance making Type I and Type II errors which they would not have made had they
received perfect careers guidance. NBL3 (Q) and NBL4 (Q)  are the increased losses from increased Type
I and Type II errors due to the fall in numbers of individuals who make use of the careers guidance when
it is imperfect. The higher the quality of careers guidance given, the smaller will the sum of these
four terms be. 
An overall index, I(Q) of the quality of the careers guidance given is provided by the ratio:
                         I(Q) = TB(Q) / TB(Qp)                                                                          (3.49)
with I(Q) = 1.0 = 100 per cent for perfect careers guidance, but declining below 100 per cent the greater
are the Type I and Type II errors involved in (3.48).
The total net benefit, TNB(Q), from providing imperfect careers guidance of quality Q, rather than44
providing no careers guidance, is given by:
            TNB(Q) = TB(Q) - TBA + [C(Qp) - C(Q)]                                                                   (3.50)
where TBA is the total benefit TBA which  individuals would receive, inclusive of Type I and Type II
errors, in the absence of any careers guidance in equation (3.45). The last term in the square bracket in
(3.50) equals the saving in administrative cost which may occur through running an imperfect careers
guidance service at quality level Q rather than a perfect one at quality level Qp . In a parallel way to Section
2 above, we may define an optimal quality, Q*, of careers guidance as the quality level which
maximises (3.5), and which will therefore involve:
                MTB(Q*) = MC(Q*)                                                                                                (3.51)
i.e. equating the marginal total benefit, MTB(Q), of additional quality in the provision of careers guidance
to the marginal cost, MC(Q), of providing the higher quality careers guidance at the optimal quality level
Q*.
Where part, or all, of the cost of providing higher quality careers guidance falls upon the individual career
advisee, through an additional fee, this will shift part, or all, of the total cost from the career guidance
provider and their funding source on to the individual advisee. If this additional fee is included within the
computation of the marginal total benefit to the individual advisee, the result will be a reduction in the left-
hand side of equation (3.51) by the amount of this additional fee, so long as they are  willing to pay for this
quality of careers guidance at the increase fee level. If we interpret the right-hand side of equation (3.51)
as referring to the cost to the career guidance provider net of fee income, the RHS of equation (3.51) will
also be reduced by the same amount. So long as the demand for careers guidance is not price sensitive
to the level of fees, this will leave the optimal quality of careers guidance unchanged.  45
3h. The Information Required to Evaluate the Monetary Benefits of Improved Quality of Careers
Guidance
We have seen in our above analysis that the concept of perfect careers guidance provides a useful
benchmark against which lower quality careers guidance can be evaluated. As noted above, perfect
careers guidance results in all the individuals who make use of the careers guidance being perfectly assessed
as to their suitability to succeed in different possible career moves and receiving advice as to their optimal
career move, which the individual advisee can then invest in knowing that they will succeed in it.  We have
also made use of the concept of a vector (or list or set) of the characteristics, ci , of the skills,
aptitudes and talents of the individual advisee which are relevant to their careers guidance and their
suitability for different possible career moves. 
This suggests that an information base is needed of the different relevant characteristics of careers
advisees who make use of each careers guidance service, and of the type of career options which
would be most suited to them, given these individual characteristics, if they had the benefit of
perfect careers guidance. The evaluation of the monetary benefits of each optimal career option requires
information on the magnitude of the investment costs in undertaking the career move and the future net
income which the individual would receive as a result of successfully making their optimal career move. This
needs to be compared with the future net income which the individual would expect to receive in the
absence of any careers guidance. Given that individuals may be risk averse, and experience diminishing
marginal utility of income when facing the consequences of career investment decisions involving
uncertainty, an adjustment to these monetary values may be made by taking the logarithms of the monetary
outcomes to convert them to utility-adjusted values.
We have also made use of the concept of Type I and Type II errors in the evaluation of the monetary
benefits of careers guidance that is less than perfect. A Type I error is one where the individual does not
undertake the career move which would be optimal for them but instead selects a less beneficial career
option, where this less beneficial career option may be making no career move at all compared to the
individual’s existing career. A Type II error occurs when an individual unsuccessfully invest in a career
move and it does not payoff for them , compared to their not making a career move and remaining with46
their existing career. The evaluation of the cost of Type I errors requires information on the lower level
of net income they will receive if they make a less beneficial career move, and the numbers of individuals
who receive the imperfect careers guidance who choose such less beneficial career options.  The
evaluation of the cost of Type I errors requires information on the lower level of net income they will
receive if they make a less beneficial career move and succeed in them, and the numbers of individuals who
receive the imperfect careers guidance who are successful in such less beneficial career options. The
evaluation of the cost of Type II errors requires information on the even lower level of net income they
will receive if they make a less beneficial career move and do not succeed in them, and the numbers of
individuals who receive the imperfect careers guidance who are unsuccessful in such less beneficial career
moves. 
In addition, an assessment is required of the difference in the numbers of individual career advisees that a
poor quality careers guidance service attracts compared to the number of individuals who they would have
attracted if they had offered perfect careers guidance, and the associated monetary value of the reductions
in Type I and Type II errors which could have been achieved by such individuals not make their own career
decisions without sound careers guidance.   
Whilst, for the sake of simplicity, we have focused on a two-period analysis in this section, our earlier
insights from Section 2 above on the value of human capital derived from a multi-period analysis still
hold. The information on future net income required in the multi-period analysis is the discounted value
of future net income, adjusted where desirable by taking the logarithm of net income to allow for risk
aversion and diminishing marginal utility of income. 47
4. IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LIFE
In this section we relax our earlier assumption that net income is the only benefit accruing to the individual
careers advisee as a result of a career move. Instead we allow for the possibility that other quality of life
variables may enter into the utility function of the individual careers advisee, both during the periods of time
in which the individual is working in a specifies job or during periods of time in which they are engaged in
training or further education.
One important existing approach to incorporating quality of  life assessments into the measurement of
overall net benefits is that provided by the concept of the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) in health
economics. The basic approach to the use of this concept involves the use of a valuation matrix that seeks
to value the relative importance of different combinations of the underlying quality of life variables on a scale
from zero to one. A value of zero corresponds here to being dead, whereas a value of one corresponds
to perfect health. 
Two main quality of life variables which have been used to evaluate states of health between full health and
death are physical mobility and freedom from pain. As in Kind, Rosser and Williams (1982), the
variable representing states of physical disability has been given eight possible values, namely I
corresponding to no disability; II to slight social disability; III to severe social disability or slight impairment
of performance at work, or both, with ability to perform all housework except heavy tasks;. IV to the
choice of work or performance at work severely limited, and with housewives and old people only able
to carry out light housework and shopping; V to unable to undertake any paid employment, unable to
continue education, old people confined to home except for escorted outings or short walks, and
housewives only able to perform a few single tasks; VI to be confined to a chair or wheelchair; VII to being
confined to bed; and VIII to being unconscious. Four levels of pain and distress for each of these levels of
disability were defined, with A = none, B = mild, C = moderate, and D = severe. The median valuations
for each of these combinations (such as VI C) were derived from the responses of  70 individuals, including
doctors, compared to the zero-one scale from perfect health to being dead. Some combinations involving
severe disability and/or high levels of distress were given a negative score, with the implication that they
were considered as worse than being dead. The resultant valuations defined the associated Rosser Index48
for the health states corresponding to these combinations of the underlying quality of life variables.
Under conditions of certainty, a given medical intervention, such as a surgical operation, on a patient would
be expected to result in some increase in life expectancy of the patient and/or improvement in the quality
of their life compared to their existing life expectancy and existing quality of life without the intervention.
Thus in Figure 4.1, the patient in the absence of the surgical intervention might be expected to live 5 more
years, with a quality of life profile, according to the Rosser Index measurement, that deteriorates slightly
in the first four years and then declines rapidly in the fifth year. After the surgical intervention, the patient
has an enhanced life expectancy of 10 years, with a quality of life in the first five years above that which
they would have received without the surgical intervention, but which declines substantially as they
approach the tenth year. The shaded area indicates the QALY measure of the benefit of the operation,
taking into account not only the length of extended life gained but also the increase in the quality of life of
each year of life.
FIGURE 4.149
The analysis may be extended to take into account risk and uncertainty. Thus if there is an 80 per cent
chance of the satisfactory outcome of the surgical operation in Figure 4.1, but a 20 per cent chance of death
during the operation, the latter is given a value of zero weighted by the probability of 0.2, which is then
added to the above increase in QALYs if the operation is successful multiplied by the probability of 0.8 of
the operation being successful (see Williams, 1985).
There are five main methods which have been used to elicit individual valuations on the quality of life
associated with different health states (see Torrance, 1986; Dolan, 2000). The first of these is the Visual
Analogue Scale (VAS) which, in a similar way to the Rosser Index, asks respondents to rate the different
health scales on a numerical scale between the best outcome of one (or one hundred per cent) and the
worst outcome of zero. The psychometric  bisection method (see Stevens, 1971) then asks individuals
to rate the health state which they consider to be approximately midway on this scale, followed by the
health states  which they consider approximately midway between this health state and the best and worst
health states respectively, and so forth until finer and finer divisions are made in the interval scale to classify
health states and their corresponding qualities of life.
The second method for deriving individual valuations on the quality of life uses the Standard Gamble (SG)
approach. Here individuals are asked to consider an operation or other form of medical treatment with two
possible quality of life outcomes, a good outcome, Lg , if the operation is successful, and a bad outcome,
Lb , if it is unsuccessful. The probability of the treatment being a success is given by q and the probability
of it not being a success is given by (1 - q). Under the expected utility approach, this gamble will have an
expected utility of:
                           E(U) = q U(Lg) + ( 1 - q). U (Lb )                                                          (4.1)
The individual is then asked to consider an intermediate health state (better than death)  with a quality of
life of Lm, as an alternative to facing the risk of the medical treatment. They are then asked to  assess the
value of the probability of success of the medical treatment which would make them indifferent between
facing the uncertain medical treatment, with its possible good outcome, Lg , for the quality of life, but also
its possible bad outcome, Lb , and having instead the intermediate quality of life, Lm , with certainty. For50
this probability q’, we then have:
                U(Lm) = E(U) = q’. U(Lg) + ( 1 - q’). U (Lb )                                                     (4.2)
If the good outcome, Lg , corresponds to perfect health, with a standardised utility rating of 1.0, and the
bad outcome, Lb , corresponds to death, with a standardised utility rating of  0, (4.2) yields:
                                 U(Lm) = q’                                                                                        (4.3)
so that the utility which the individual attaches to the intermediate quality of life, Lm , can be derived directly
from the probability of the good outcome at which the individual respondent would be indifferent between
these two prospects, and will lie between zero and one.
To evaluate qualities of life, Lw , worse than death, the intermediate state chosen is death, with the medical
treatment offering the prospect of full health (with a standardised utility rating of 1.0) with probability q and
of the outcome, L w , with probability 1- q. For the probability, q”, at which the individual is indifferent
between this gamble and death with certainty (with its associated standardised utility rating of zero), we
have:
                 0 = q” + (1 - q”). U(Lw )   i.e. U(Lw ) = - q” / ( 1 - q” )                                      (4.4)
so that a quality of life that is considered to be worse than death has a negative utility rating,  given by q”
over ( 1 - q”).
The third main approach to deriving quality of life valuations in health economics is the Time Trade-Off
(TT-O) method. This method asks individuals to consider two alternative prospects under certainty. The
first prospect involves living for x years of perfect health ( with a standardised utility rating of 1.0 for each
year) and then dying straight-away.  The second prospect involves living for a greater number, y, years,
but with a lower quality of life, Lm . If x’ is the number of years of perfect health for which the individual
would be indifferent between these two prospects, we have under the QALY approach that values years51
times quality of life ratings:
          x’ = y. U(Lm ) so that U(Lm ) = x’/ y                                                          (4.5)
 
For a quality of life, Lw , that is worse than death, the choice presented to the individual is firstly immediate
death, and secondly y years with quality of  life Lw followed by x years of perfect health. If x” is the number
of years of perfect health at which the individual is indifferent between these two prospects, we have:
      0 =  y. U(Lw ) + x”  i.e. U(Lw ) = - x”/ y                                                             (4.6)
The fourth main method for valuing quality of life in health economics is the Person Trade-Off (PT-O)
method, which considers choices between two treatments that will benefit different numbers of individuals,
so that a trade-off is derived between the total number of years of healthy life enjoyed by x individuals and
the total number of years with a lower quality of life enjoyed by y individuals (see Dolan, 2000; Williams
and Cookson, 2000).
The fifth main method for valuing quality of life is the Willingness To Pay (WTP) approach, which
considers how much money each individual would be prepared to pay for improvements in their quality and
length of life. This incorporates their valuation of the length and quality of life into their own preference
assessment for all variables which affect their overall welfare. However,  willingness to pay will depend not
just upon an individual’s relative preference between quality and length of life and other variables, such as
immediate satisfaction from the consumption of commodities which may cause later health problems. It will
also depend upon the individual’s ability to pay and level of income. Simply adding individual willingnesses
to pay across individuals will give more implicit weight to richer individuals, who are more able to pay than
poorer individuals. To counteract this effect and instead incorporate considerations of distributional
equity into the analysis, different logarithmic weights may be attached to each individual’s willingness to









              (4.7)
where WTPi is the willingness to pay for increases in the quality and length of life of individual i, and , is
a coefficient reflecting the degree of social aversion to inequality in the distribution of the monetary value
of the benefits from increased quality and length of life (see Atkinson, 1970). For the case of , = 1, we
have:
                                     (4.8)
In order to incorporate quality of life variables, other than net income, into our analysis of the
benefits of careers guidance, we must first identify these other variables. These will be ones which,
alongside net income, affect the overall payoff to the individual of choosing any particular career option.
These other quality of life variables may include:
i. the level of mental interest which the individual has in the tasks involved
ii.  the level of mental stress which the individual experiences
iii. the level and nature of the physical activity involved in the tasks
iv. the level of self-esteem which the individual derives from the activities and status involved
v. the extent of the control over their activities which the individual has 
vi. the sense of achievement which the individual derives from the activities 
vii. the extent of social interaction the individual has with their colleagues and customers53
viii. the extent of social esteem which the individual derives
  
ix. the travel time taken between the individual’s home and place of work or study
x. the level of stress/enjoyment experienced during travel between the individual’s home and place of work
or study
xi. the amount and quality of the time which the individual spends with their partner when the individual has
the specified job, education or training 
xii. the amount and quality of the time which the individual spends with their children when the individual
has the specified job, education or training 
xiii. the extent and quality of the social interaction which the individual has with others outside the
workplace when they have the specified job, education or training
xiv. the quality of schooling which the individual’s children receive when the individual is living in the
accommodation the individual lives in when they have the specified job, education or training
xv. the extent of the physical activity the individual engages in outside their job, training or education
xvi. the extent of substance abuse which the individual engages in
xvii. the quality of the physical environment which the individual experiences in their place of work, training
or education
xviii.  the quality of the physical environment which the individual and their family experience outside the
place of work, training or education when the individual has the specified job, or is undertaking the
education or training.54




Several of these variables may in turn feed into the level of job satisfaction which the individual derives
from the job, training or education, and the level of physical and mental health which the experience as
a result of undertaking it. If we are able to measure the above variables in a meaningful way, we may
represent these (non-income) quality of life variables for individual i at time t as a vector Li t = (Li t1 , ....,
Li t m ) , where Li t j denotes the level of the jbh quality of life variable for individual i at time t.  The future
time path of quality of life variable which the individual experiences may also be represented by the vector
Li = (Li 1 , ... Li n ) .
We may now extend the concept of the individual’s human capital to include these quality of life variables
through amending our earlier equation (2.1) to become:
                      (4.9)
where the individual utility functions U i t for each period of time t embodies also the individual’s relative
weight which they put upon benefits received at time t compared to other times, and hence their subjective
degree of time preference.  One role for high quality careers guidance is  again to make the individual
advisee more aware of the extent of the enhanced net income and quality of life which they may experience
in future years as a result of a career move, and hence to pay more attention to these future benefits.
In the case of career moves which improve the individual’s physical and mental health status, direct use may
be made of the evaluation techniques discussed above for measuring the resultant increases in Quality
Adjusted Life Years which the individual thereby experiences, either from improved quality of life or from
extensions in the length of life, or both. However, in the case of  quality of life variables which do not
predominantly affect the individual’s physical and mental health, we need to incorporate these non-income
quality of life variables into the analysis alongside income variables, as in equation (4.9).
The increase in the value of human capital which the individual experiences as a result of a career move
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where Yo
i t and Yoi t   are the value of the net income and quality of life variables of the individual at time t
before the career change and Y’
i t and Y’i t are their value after the career change. This formulation allows
for the possibility that the individual’s net income and the different (non-income) quality of life variables may
each change in different ways over the future years as a result of the career move, some potentially initially
falling but later increasing, but not all necessarily going in the same direction. Thus a career move may result
in higher net income in later years but also more time in commuting to work in a way which reduces the
relevant non-income quality of life variable.
The relative importance of each of these income and quality of life variables depends upon the
individual’s preferences and associated utility function Ui t at each point in time. Micro-economic analysis
suggests that each individual will have an indifference map between these variables embodying these
preferences and utility function. Our earlier decision analysis framework using  a utility of income function
based upon the single variable of income can be extended to decisions with multiple-attributes (see
Keene and Raiffa, 1976; French, 1989), involving not just income but also other quality of life variables.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.2 below for the illustrative case of two variables, with Y i t representing
individual i’s net income at time t and L i t j the value of their (non-income) quality of life variable j at time
t. The combination of net income and quality of life variable at point a is here considered by the individual
as equivalent to the combination at point b, which has a higher level of net income but a lower quality of
life variable than at point a. The slope of the indifference curve through a and b represents the trade-off
or marginal rate of substitution between net income and the quality of life variable for the individual.  If the
individual suffers a further fall in the quality of life in going from point b to point k in Figure 4.2, they require
an even greater increase in net income in going from b to k to compensate them for a given fall in quality
of life than they do in going from a to b. The trade-off between these variables is in general then not a
constant one.56
FIGURE 4.2
We may nevertheless derive a monetary value to the overall benefit which the individual receives from
any given combination of net income and quality of life variables. We may do so through the concept of
equivalent net income. This involves the level of net income which if received when the individual has
quality of life variables at a specified standard level would make the individual indifferent between this
given combination and the actual combination of net income and quality of life they will experience. Thus
in Figure 4.2 the individual is indifferent between point k, involving the actual combination of net income
and quality of life they will experience if they stay with their present career, and point b. Point b involves
a quality of life at the specified standard level, Ls
i t j , together with a level of net income level of YEo
i t .  YEo
i
t is therefore the equivalent net income which, when received together with a quality of life at the specified
standard level,  would make the individual indifferent between this combination and the actual combination
of net income and quality of life which they experience in their present career at point k.








it ]/(1 % ri)
advisee receives as a result of a career move. A career move will in general result in a move to a different
indifference curve at time t than the one on which they would have been had they not made a career move.
The move from point k in Figure 4.2 to point h, for instance, involves an increase both in the individual’s
net income and their quality of life variable, placing them on a higher indifference curve than at point k. We
may derive a  monetary value to the overall benefit they receive from the move through the corresponding
concept of the equivalent gain in net income which would bring about the same utility gain for the
individual  at the specified standard level of the quality of life variables as the career move does.
The derivation of this equivalent gain requires each individual career advisee to assess the importance to
themselves of each of the non-income quality of life variables, such as those listed above. If the quality of
life variable is below the standard specified level, as in Figure 4.2 for points k and h, such as because the
career options involve little leisure time for them, they need to specify how much income they would be
prepared to give up to increase this quality of life variable to the standard level. If the quality of
life variable is below the standard specified level, as in Figure 4.2 for points a and e, such as because the
career options involve considerable leisure time for them, they need to specify how much additional
income they would be require in order to be willing to reduce this quality of life variable to the
standard level. The calculation therefore involves similar considerations to those involved in the
Willingness to Pay approach discussed above.  
If we again set the standard level of the quality of life variable in Figure 4.2 at the level Ls
i t j , the move from
points b to f achieves the same increase in utility levels at this standard quality of life as does the career
move from k to h. As above, the equivalent net income of point b in Figure 4.2 is   YEo
i t , whereas the
equivalent net income of point f  is YE’
i t in Figure 4.2. The gain in equivalent net income levels between
points b and f  at this standard quality of life in Figure 4.2 is therefore given by YE ‘
i t   -  YEo
i t .
When we insert this monetary value at time t of  the career move into equation (4.10), we obtain a value
for the resultant increase in human capital of:
                  (4.11)58
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where ri is the individual’s subjective rate of time preference, which we assume constant over time. The
level of equivalent net income which results from a career move will depend upon the quality, Qi , of the
careers guidance offered to the individual, so that YE ‘
i t is a function of Qi. Higher quality careers guidance
should result in changes in net income and quality of life that in general raise the individual to a higher utility
level, making   YE ‘
i t in general an increasing function of the quality of careers guidance given, after
any initial period of training or education has been completed.
Since quality of life considerations are directly involved in the determination of  YE ‘
i t , we may therefore
extend our earlier equation (2.5) for the net benefit that results from careers guidance at the quality level
Qi to include quality of life considerations. This will involve the new evaluation equation:
(4.12)
where Ci (Qi ) is again the cost of providing the level of quality of careers guidance to individual i, and Di
(Qi ) is the extent of any subsidy element of the additional training or education which they undertake as
a result of the careers guidance. An optimal level of careers guidance, Q*i , for the individual advisee may
again be defined by the value of Qi  which maximises the net benefit, denoted by NBi (Qi ), of the careers
guidance in (4.12). This optimal level can be used as a benchmark or standard against which all guidance
providers can be judged in assessing the value for money and relative effectiveness of their provision
for any given individual advisee, compared to this optimal level of quality.
We may again include considerations of equity into the analysis by incorporating some degree of  social
aversion to inequality in the distribution of monetary benefits, including those adjusted for quality
of life considerations. If we adopt a formulation similar to that of (4.8) above, we may also incorporate the
considerations of diminishing marginal utility of income and risk aversion discussed in Section 3 above. This
involves taking the logarithms of the corresponding levels of income, and weighting by a relative policy
weight, w1 , the cost, Ci , to the public sector of providing the careers guidance to individual i,  and of any
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A higher relative policy weight, w1 , on the costs to the public purse may itself a higher degree of tightness
in the available budget for these activities. Where part or all of the cost of the career guidance falls on the
individual advisee as a fee, this will reduce the level of net income of the individual advisee in (4.13) by the
amount of the fee, so long as their demand for the careers guidance is not price sensitive. Only that part
accruing to the public purse, or other sources of external finance, is then included within the computation
of the cost Ci , net of fee income receipts.
We can then sum the resultant total value of net benefit to each individual i across all the individual career
advisees, i.e.
                            (4.14)
to yield the total net benefit generated by careers guidance at level Q = (Q1 , ... ,Qm ) to each individual
career advisee.60
5. WIDER BENEFITS
There are a number of important wider social benefits which are likely to generated by high quality careers
guidance, and which could be included in a cost-benefit analysis of such careers guidance. These wider
social benefits are likely to include firstly:
5a. Increased Tax Yields to the Exchequer  
When the existence of taxation is taken into account, the question arises as to how we should define the
variable of net income which we have considered in previous sections as accruing to the individual under
different career options. If we ignore distributional considerations, from the viewpoint of the cost-
benefit analysis, we may  include within the income variable the gross income earned by the individual
during each period of time under the career option, before tax, before deducting job-related expenditures
to arrive at the individual’s net income.  Whilst the income tax paid by the individual out of their gross
income accrues to the Exchequer, distributional indifference requires that we pay attention to the sum of
the income tax paid and the net income received by the individual after tax, i.e. the gross income of the
individual.
However, it is likely that in making their own career decisions, individuals will pay attention to their own
resultant net income after tax, rather than to their resultant income before tax. This itself will mean that
the social benefit from individuals improving their life-time career earnings as a result of high quality
careers guidance exceeds the private benefit to the individual career advisee, whenever they will pay
increased income tax (and National Insurance contributions) as a result of a career move. The Exchequer
here is essentially  a shareholder in the human capital of the individual career advisee, who will benefit
from its enhanced value. Such an enhanced value  extends the tax base on which the Exchequer can draw
to boost public finances.
If individual career advisees themselves have to bear the full cost of the careers guidance given, the level
of investment which they undertake in improving their own human capital will tend to be sub-optimal from
a social viewpoint. The cost-benefit analysis can then be linked to a case for an optimal level of subsidy61
to the careers guidance service and to the providers of additional training and further education to facilitate
higher quality careers guidance and to encourage a more socially optimal  level of investment in human
capital.
When distributional indifference does not prevail, the relevant net income variables should be computed
net of both job-related expenditures and net of income tax. However, an additional term is required to
be added to the right-hand side of the computation of net social benefits from the careers guidance in
equation (4.14) above equal to the total additional tax revenue generated as a result of the career moves
made by careers advisees, weighted by the relative social weight upon income in the hands of the
Exchequer rather than in the hands of individual taxpayers.
The wider social benefits resulting from beneficial career moves by individual career advisees will similarly
include:
5b. Reductions in Unemployment and Other Social Security Costs to the Exchequer
These benefit payments will act like negative tax payments, boosting the net income after tax and benefit
payments received by individuals who are unemployed or in low paid jobs. Securing a job, rather than
being unemployed, or securing a better paid job, rather than a low paid job, through high quality careers
guidance will reduce these costs to the Exchequer. Again, under distributional indifference, we may
consider in the cost-benefit analysis simply the sum of these cost savings plus the changes in the net
income after tax and benefit payments of the individuals concerned. This sum will again equal the
change in the individual’s  gross income that results from the career move. However, in the absence of
distributional indifference, we must evaluate the net income of each individual under each career
option, net of job-related expenditures and of tax and benefit payments in the calculation of the net
income variables Yi in our above analysis. We must then deduct from the right-hand side of equation (4.14)
the increased tax yield plus saving in unemployment and other social security payments, weighted
by any relative social weight on income in the hands of the Exchequer, in order to derive the measure of
net social benefit from the careers guidance.62
The calculation of the benefits of increased tax yield plus saving in unemployment and other social security
payments must take into account the potential long-term nature of the unemployment which the individual
may otherwise experience in the absence of high quality careers guidance. In the presence of high rates of
technological change, cyclical down-turns, and  demand and supply shocks to the economy, such as
from oil price increases, individuals may suffer a high risk of unemployment in their original  occupation or
location. In the absence of high quality careers guidance, there is a danger that initial unemployment will
develop into more permanent long-term unemployment. The value of their human capital will then
be substantially damaged by the loss of the present value of the future earnings they would otherwise
have obtained if they had not become unemployed. 
The result will be a form of hysteresis, in which a temporary shock to the economy results in permanent
long-term damage to human capital. High quality careers guidance, combined with other measures, such
as well-designed re-training programmes, can seek to avoid such long-term damage by increasing the
flexibility with which individuals, and the labour market as a whole, can respond to technological change,
cyclical down-turns and to supply and demand shocks. The calculation of the benefits of high quality
careers guidance therefore needs to include the  long-term present value of the increase in future net
income which the individuals receive if the careers guidance enables them to avoid the risk of long-term
unemployment, in a similar way to the calculations indicated in Section 2 above. In addition, if we calculate
the individual earnings net of tax and benefit payments, the assessment of the benefits of high quality careers
guidance must include the long-term present value of the increased tax yield plus saving in unemployment
and other social security payments which results from avoiding long-term unemployment. High quality
careers guidance can then be an important complement to government programmes, such as Welfare to
Work and the New Deal for young unemployed people in the 18-24 age group (DfEE, 1999). 
A further interesting direction in which there may be a wider social benefit from beneficial career moves
from high quality careers guidance arises from:63
5c. Reductions in Health Care Costs on the National Health Service
That there is a socio-economic gradient of individual health status across different geographical areas
and occupations is well-documented (see e.g.  Marmot and Mustard, 1994; Mayston 2000b). Encouraging
individual career advisees to make career moves which boost their net income and quality of life may well
result in an improved health status for the individual. This in turn may reduce their need for health care
during their working life and early years of retirement. Moreover, quantitative estimates are available (e.g.
Carr-Hill et al, 1994) of the extent to which particular  variables, including job-related one such as
unemployment, impact upon the need for additional health care expenditure. Reductions in local
unemployment levels through the provision of high quality careers guidance would then have a quantifiable
impact on the need for additional expenditure by the NHS. If the associated health care costs would have
fallen on the National Health Service (NHS), they would have been a source of additional pressure upon
public expenditure that is financed out of general taxation. The saving of this additional health care cost
needs  to be added to the additional tax revenue and benefits savings generated by the career moves which
the careers guidance encourages. 
We have discussed above the incorporation of the benefits to the individual themselves from improvements
in the quality and length of life which result from a career move. If the career move extends the length
of life of the individual, this may also in the long run increase the health care costs which fall upon the
National Health Service. How far this is true depends upon the extent to which the individual is more likely
to experience long periods of health deterioration that are expensive to treat close to the end of their life,
as a result of the career move. A move from an occupation in which individuals tend to die early from
incurable diseases to an occupation in which they live for many years, but then suffer several years of
dementia, will yield changes in the quality and length of life for the individual themselves which may be
evaluated using the concepts of Quality Adjusted Life Years discussed above. However, such a move may
actually increase the health care costs that are in the long run imposed upon the NHS, although this increase
may be more than offset by the additional tax payments which the individual makes over their extended life-
time as a result of the career move.
Health care costs which fall upon the private health care sector represent a form of payment out of the net64
income of the individual, like their expenditure on other consumption items. Whilst account needs to be
taken of the changes in the quality and length of life variables for the individual themselves that may be
associated with these health care costs, they do not represent a form of additional public expenditure that
must be offset against enhanced tax yields in the cost-benefit analysis.   
 
5d. Reductions in the Frequency and Costs of Crime
One important role for high quality careers guidance is to enable individuals who would otherwise be
unemployed to find new career opportunities. The statistical association between unemployment and
crime, and the possible causal links between variables such as unemployment, substance abuse, and crime
rates,  suggests that a reduction in unemployment may assist in reducing crime rates. In a survey of empirical
studies on unemployment and crime, Freeman (1999) found that there was much stronger support for the
hypothesis that crime is linked closely to unemployment amongst data on individuals than from time-series
analysis of trends over time, or in cross-section studies across different localities. The studies based upon
data on individuals found that individuals who are prone to unemployment “are more likely to commit crimes
and that people who commit crimes are more likely to do so during spells of unemployment”. 
A longitudinal study of 411 young men by Farrington et al (1986) found that the link between
unemployment and crime was much greater amongst those with a history of low status jobs. Freeman
(1999) also concludes that “the magnitude of the worsened job market opportunities for less skilled
young men and rise in inequality” from 1973 onwards “were sufficiently large to suggest that they could
have played a major role in the increase in criminal activity” (emphasis added). This is consistent with an
economic model of participation in crime in which the expected payoff to crime, after taking account of the
risks of detection and conviction and the likely penalties, is compared by potential participants with the
other economic activities which they could engage in. If the latter employment opportunities are of low
value, the tendency to crime will be greater for those individuals who are at the margin of such participation
in crime. Careers guidance may then have a benefit in reducing the costs of crime if it reaches those
individuals who might otherwise commit crime in the future, and for who are a stage in their life when
greater prospects of employment and increased job-related skills may discourage them from embarking65
on criminal activity, or continuing with it as much as otherwise. 
Coopers and Lybrand (1994) have estimated the marginal cost of an additional youth crime to be at least
£2,300, of which nearly half would be recoverable from the public purse by  less expenditure needed
on the Criminal Justice System, and by local government and fire brigades responding to vandalism, criminal
damage, fire damage and arson. Their cost estimate does not include any psychological benefits from
reduced crime avoiding distress to victims or lessening the fear of crime amongst the elderly or others.
Liddle (1998) carried out a more extensive analysis of the social costs imposed by a sample of offenders
in the 15 - 17 population over their history of crime to date, in a study for the National Association for the
Care and Rehabilitation of Offenders (NACRO), and found that the total cost per respondent of their crime
history to date to average £75,365 per respondent. When extrapolated to the national population of
approximately 2,500 offending individuals in this age group, the total cost of their crime to date totalled over
£188 million.  
Risk factors identified in these respondent case studies (Liddle, 1998) as contributing to the likelihood
of a history of crime included lack of skills and training, drug and/or alcohol abuse, and unstable family
living conditions. High quality careers guidance to individuals who might otherwise be unemployed or lack
skills and training may then potentially reduce these risk factors, both for  young initial offenders and for
older adults, and their children. The high rate of  re-offending of  many of those who become caught up
in the Criminal Justice System suggests that  there are likely to be long-term future costs of crime, unless
other more positive opportunities are  available to the individual. High quality careers guidance may then
yield large potential long-term cost savings, equal to the present value of the savings in the costs of
crime which a reduction in the  risk factors that are associated with participation in crime is likely to
produce. However, this requires high quality careers guidance to be available to those at risk at points in
their lives when they can make progress in escaping from the cumulative forces which may otherwise lead
to a persistent history of crime. The extent to which careers guidance does succeed in these directions
therefore needs to be carefully monitored, and combined with costings of the reduction in crime rates which
this may generate. 66
5e. Macro-economic Benefits
High quality careers guidance, particularly to those who might otherwise be unemployed,  is also likely to
have substantial macro-economic benefits. These relate firstly to the concept of mismatch between the
demand for labour in different occupations and geographical areas and the available supply. The
level of mismatch within the British economy is considered by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, p. 331)
to explain at least a third of all unemployment in Britain. Mismatch is reflected in substantial variations in
the ratio between local unemployment rates and local vacancy rates across different locations within the
UK and across different occupational and industrial job classifications. High quality careers guidance, in
conjunction with training and further education opportunities, can help to reduce this mismatch by making
individuals who are unemployed in one particular geographic location, industry and/or occupation more
aware of the increased employment opportunities which are available to them through geographical
relocation and/or retraining.
High levels of mismatch will imply that in some local  labour markets unemployment if high, whereas in
others it is low. The Phillips curve relationship between unemployment and inflation means that low rates
of unemployment will result in higher rates of inflation than do high rates of unemployment. This relationship
is likely to be non-linear, with an increasing slope, of the additional inflation associated by subsequent
equal reductions in the unemployment rate increasing as the unemployment rate approaches zero. In such
a case, a high unemployment rate in one local labour market when combined with a low unemployment rate
in another local labour market will result in a higher overall level of inflation than if the unemployment
rate been equalised between the two labour markets.
If an individual who is unemployed in one location or occupation relocates or retrains so that they can now
compete in another labour market where the unemployment rate is low, they will exert competitive
downward pressure upon the rate of wage inflation in the second labour market even if they do not obtain
a job in it for some time. If they do obtain a job, the level of vacancies in the second labour market will
decline and the level of excess demand, due to demand exceeding supply, in this second labour market
will be reduced, again easing inflationary wage pressures.67
The effect of such a reduction in the level of mismatch between the demand for labour in different locations
and jobs and the available supply is to reduce the level of wage inflation which is associated with any
given average level of unemployment across the economy as a whole.  If the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
or the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, have a target rate of inflation for the
economy as a whole, the economy can now be run at a higher level of aggregate demand, and a lower
average rate of employment, than otherwise without raising interest rates or taxation to curb aggregate
demand. The benefit of the reduction in mismatch which improved careers guidance and retraining
opportunities achieve is the increase in  aggregate demand, as measured by the GDP increase, which
such a reduction makes possible. 
The increase in GDP will include the additional net income which the previously unemployed individual
receive as a result of their new employment, as well as that accruing to other individuals who find
themselves with new job opportunities as the level of aggregate demand is expanded to a new higher level.
The initial mismatch may, for instance, relate to a shortage of skilled labour. This shortage may be partially
relieved by a previously unskilled worker undertaking training following careers guidance to become a
skilled worker. The availability of another skilled worker may in turn, however, set up a need for another
unskilled worker to service the skilled worker in the production process, so that there is some degree of
complementarity in the demand for the two types of labour. The expansion of demand to relieve mismatch
and increase production can then extend to the employment of both workers without inflationary
consequences (see Johnson and Layard, 1986).
As we have noted above, high quality careers guidance may help individuals who are initially unemployed
from becoming long-term unemployed. If the number of months and years in which the individual is
unemployed increase, both skills and motivation may decline, so that permanent damage to their human
capital results. The hysteresis which is  associated with the long-term damage resulting from initial
increases in unemployment will not only impair the value of the individual’s human capital. It will
also result in an increased pool of long-term unemployed who offer little effective competition in the
labour market to constrain inflationary pressure at any given level of aggregate demand, and who have
effectively withdraw from the mainstream labour market as a source of labour supply. The benefit from high
quality careers guidance which reduces the number of individuals who become long-term unemployed will68
then itself be a long-term one, requiring calculation of the present value of the future stream of
increases in aggregate demand and GDP which are feasible at any given target rate of inflation if the
long-term unemployment rate is thereby reduced.
 
High quality careers guidance can assist not only in informing individuals of job and training opportunities
outside their present location and industry. It can also help individuals to form more realistic
expectations of their likely income if they pursue different courses of action. The use of search theory
in labour economics (see Pissarides, 1985; Mortensen, 1986) has stressed the importance of an individual’s
reservation wage. This is defined as the wage at which they are just willing to take a job in any given
period of job search. If the individual has an excessively high expectation of the wage they can ultimately
command if the keep searching for a longer period of time, their reservation wage in any given shorter
period of time will tend to be excessively high. As a result, they will refuse jobs offering a lower wage than
this excessively high reservation wage, and therefore be unemployed for longer than if they had formed
more realistic wage expectations. The level of transitional unemployment will therefore be increased,
if individuals, because of  inadequate careers guidance, take longer in their search for new employment.
However, there may not only be a loss of net income, and higher  social security cost, in the period for
which they have the initial high reservation wage. As the duration of their unemployment increases, their
skills and motivation may decline, thereby reducing also their longer term prospects and earnings. The level
of more permanent long-term unemployment may also increase, if the wage expectations which
individuals form in the absence of high quality careers guidance do not adapt sufficiently to the prevailing
labour market conditions.
5f. Net Social Benefits
We can draw the above strands together into an overall computation of the net social benefits that result
from different levels of quality of careers guidance. We will denote by NBi
o (Qi) the value of the net benefit
to individual i of the enhanced value of their human capital which results from  receiving careers guidance
at quality level Qi , adjusted for quality of life considerations, as in equation (4.13) above, but making use
of the variable of individual income computed net of tax payments and the receipt of any social security69





payments by the individual. Corresponding to (4.14), we have the total net benefit, before taking into
account the wider social benefits, to be given by:
                              (5.1)
where the summation takes place over all career advisees of a given guidance provider, or within a given
geographical area, such as a region, if this is our focus of attention. 
In order to compute the overall Net Social Benefit, NB(Q), within a social cost-benefit analysis, we
need to add to (5.1) the tax yield to the Exchequer, T(Q), that results from the changes in before-tax
income that the careers guidance of quality Q generates. In addition we need to add to (5.1) the savings
in social security benefits, S(Q), and any reductions, H(Q), in health care expenditures on the NHS that
result from the career improvements that are associated with this level of quality of careers guidance. Since
the tax yield and savings in social security and health care costs accrue here to the public purse, we will
weight them by the relative policy weight, w1 , on financial costs and benefits to the public purse compared
to money income in the hands of private individuals. Because much of the cost of crime also falls on the
public purse, we will similarly include within such relative weighting any reduction, M(Q),  in the cost of
crime which results from the improved career prospects which the careers guidance achieves. 
We have also discussed above the possibility that high quality careers guidance may help to reduce the
degree of mismatch in the labour market between the demands for particular skills in particular parts of
the country and the available labour supply. This in turn may enable the economy to be run at a higher level
of aggregate demand, that is still consistent with any given level of the inflation target for the economy at
large. The additional demand for labour, and available supply, that is generated by this higher level of
aggregate demand may include not only the labour that is newly-trained or newly re-located as a result of
the careers guidance. It may also include labour in other occupations and locations whose demand is
complementary to the newly-trained or newly-relocated labour.  Easing a bottleneck of skilled workers
through encouraging re-training may then result in more unskilled workers also being employed to work
alongside the additional skilled workers on the production line.  As a result, the net income of the unskilled
workers may also rise, as also may their quality of life from non-income variables.70
If there are macro-economic external effects on the net income and/or quality of life of other workers, these
should also be included in the calculation within the social cost-benefit analysis. This will involve an
additional term, which we will denote by NB’ (Q), computed in a similar way to (5.1) but summed over
all individuals who are not directly in receipt of careers guidance, but whose net income and/or quality of
life changes because of the reduction in mismatch that the careers guidance achieves when provided at a
given level of quality, Q.
The improved employment opportunities of these secondary workers will also in general result in increases
in the tax yield from the higher pre-tax incomes which these improved employment opportunities generate.
The value of T(Q) used in the social cost-benefit analysis should therefore include the additional tax yield
generated by the improved employment opportunities to these secondary workers. Similar remarks apply
to the savings in social security costs, S(Q), in health care costs, H(Q), and in the costs of crime, M(Q).
The overall total for the net social benefit from the careers guidance in the social cost-benefit analysis
therefore equals:
                   NSB(Q) = NBo(Q) + NB’(Q) + w1 . [T(Q) + S(Q) + H(Q) + M(Q) ]              (5.2)
A level of optimal social quality of careers guidance can be defined as that level, Q**, which maximises
the value of NSB(Q). When we take into account the definition of net individual benefit in (4.13) above,
this will be achieved when the marginal increase in the  value of human capital which higher quality
of careers guidance achieves is equated to the net marginal social cost, weighted by the policy weight
w1 placed upon net public expenditure. 
The net marginal social cost equals the additional cost to the public purse of providing the higher quality
careers guidance, and any associated subsidy element to the additional training and/or further education
involved, less the monetary value of the additional tax yield and savings in social security benefits and health
care expenditures and costs of crime which result from the higher quality careers guidance. These financial
offsets may reduce the net social cost of providing the higher quality careers guidance to a low level. The
net social cost may indeed become negative as a result of these financial offsets if  the higher quality careers71
guidance results in  large savings in social security payments because individuals who would otherwise have
been unemployed now become employed.  
The computation of the increase in human capital is carried out here using net income projections for the
individual, net of income tax and social security payments. Improvements in the quality of the careers
guidance which result in large social security payment savings may then still be justified even though they
may not substantially increase the individual advisee’s income, net of tax and social security benefits. This
highlights the potentially large diverge which may exist in some cases between the social benefits of careers
guidance and the private benefits to the individual careers advisee, and underlines the scope for assessing
the detailed case for external financial support for careers guidance services of different levels of quality in
order to achieve these wider social benefits.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a framework for the analysis of the monetary benefits from different levels of quality
of careers guidance, and associated careers guidance interview, based upon the value added which it
achieves in the value of human capital of individual careers advisees. We have also extended this
framework to include the analysis of the extent to which careers guidance improves the career choices of
individual advisees under conditions of uncertainty. The benefits from such careers guidance, and
increases in its quality, flow from the reduction in both Type I errors, of individuals failing to chose career
moves which would be optimal for them, and the Type II errors which result if individuals make career
moves that makes them worse off than making no career move. Perfect careers guidance will result in a
zero frequency of such errors. The frequency and magnitude of these errors is an indication of the extent
to which the quality of the careers guidance offered by a given provider diverges from the benchmark of
perfect careers guidance. 
We have also extended our analysis to take into account the quality of life improvements resulting from
the careers guidance, and examined how to place a monetary value on these that take account of the
preferences of the individual careers advisee. In addition, we have analysed several sources of wider social
benefits which should be included within the social cost-benefit analysis of higher quality careers
guidance.
The analytical framework can be used as the basis for the specification of the associated informational
requirements to formulate detailed quantitative estimates of the associated costs and benefits. This in turn
can support the development of a well-designed database on client characteristics, local economic and
other environmental variables, and the improvements in the net income and quality of life which result from
the careers guidance provided by different individual providers.  The above focus on the frequency and
magnitude of Type I and Type II errors as indicators of the scope for beneficially improving the quality
of existing careers guidance provision can itself, for instance, be related to quality of service indicators,
such as the degree of access to the careers guidance which is available to potential client groups who could
benefit from high quality careers guidance by reducing the extent of Type I and Type II errors in their
existing career choices, and of the quality of information which is available to them.73
The development of a well-designed database based upon such analytical foundations can assist careers
guidance providers in identifying beneficial career moves for individual advisees. In addition, it can generate
well-designed performance indicators which demonstrate the scope for further progress in improving
the quality of careers guidance provision, and the quantitative benefits of  this improvement in quality.
The conceptual framework theory we have developed can be linked to analytical techniques, such as Data
Envelopment Analysis (see Mayston and Jesson, 1988) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (see Mayston and
Jesson, 1999), which can identify current best practice providers of careers guidance, taking into account
the nature of the client groups which they serve. In addition, they can be used to assess the relative
effectiveness and value for money of other existing providers and the quantitative scope that exists
for securing benefits from improving the quality of their provision. The identification of best practice can
itself be used to define standards of delivery and targets for service delivery and the quantitative benefits
associated with these targets.
The above framework theory can also be used to support the detailed appraisal of the case for different
levels of financial support for individual careers guidance providers, and for the system as a whole, to
achieve different possible standards of careers guidance quality. In addition, it can  assist in the appraisal
of the optimal level of fees to careers guidance advisees, once we relax our earlier assumption that such
potential advisees are price insensitive, in their demand for careers guidance, to the levels of fees charged.
Reaping the potential benefits of high quality careers guidance, through  reducing the frequency and
magnitude of Type I and Type II errors by individuals in their career choices, can itself contribute directly
to the Government’s own central policy aim in the field of education and employment, namely “to give
everyone the chance, through education, training and work, to realise their full potential, and thus build an
inclusive and fair society and a competitive economy”  (DfEE, 1999). Building upon the analytical
foundations we have developed, in the directions indicated above, is therefore an important next step
towards the achievement of this  goal.74
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